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this article considers the recent international controversy over the patents held by a 
Melbourne firm, Genetic Technologies Limited (GTG), in respect of non-coding DNA and genomic 
mapping. It explores the ramifications of the GTG dispute in terms of licensing, litigation, and policy 
reform, and—as a result of this dispute—the perceived conflict between law and science. GTG has 
embarked upon an ambitious licensing program with twenty seven commercial licensees and five 
research licensees. Most significantly, GTG has obtained an exclusive licence from Myriad Genetics 
to use and exploit its medical diagnostics in Australia, New Zealand, and the Asia-Pacific region. In 
the US, GTG brought a legal action for patent infringement against the Applera Corporation and its 
subsidiaries. In response, Applera counterclaimed that the patents of GTG were invalid because they 
failed to comply with the requirements of US patent law, such as novelty, inventive step, and written 
specifications. In New Zealand, the Auckland District Health Board brought legal action in the High 
Court, seeking a declaration that the patents of GTG were invalid, and that, in any case, the Board 
has not infringed them. The New Zealand Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Economic 
Development have reported to Cabinet on the issues relating to the patenting of genetic material. 
Similarly, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has also engaged in an inquiry into gene 
patents and human health; and the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) has considered 
whether there should be a new defence in respect of experimental use and research.
 
cet article fait un survol de la controverse internationale récente au sujet des 
brevets de l’entreprise Genetic Technologies Limited (GTG) de Melbourne relativement à l’ADN non 
codant et à la cartographie génonémique. Il explore les ramifications du différend de la GTG en 
matière de la concession de licences, du contentieux et de la réforme des politiques. Ce différend 
apportera un éclairage sur le conflit perçu entre le droit et la science. La GTG a entrepris un ambitieux 
programme de concession de licences avec vingt-sept titulaires de licences commerciales et cinq 
titulaires de licences de recherche. En particulier, la GTG a obtenu une licence exclusive de Myriad 
Genetics pour l’utilisation et l’exploitation de ses diagnostics médicaux en Australie, en Nouvelle-
Zélande et dans la région Asie Pacifique. Aux États-Unis, la GTC a intenté une action en justice contre 
Applera Corporation et ses filiales pour violation de ses brevets. Applera a répliqué en alléguant 
l’invalidité des brevets de la GTG au motif que ceux-ci dérogeaient aux normes américaines du droit 
des brevets, notamment en ce qui a trait à la nouveauté, à l’activité inventive et aux spécifications 
écrites. En Nouvelle-Zélande, la Commission de santé du district de Auckland a déposé une action 
devant la Haute Cour en demandant une déclaration d’invalidité des brevets de la GTG et, qu’il y ait 
ou non invalidité, que la Commission n’avait pas porté atteinte à ces brevets. Le ministère de la Santé 
et le ministère du Développement économique de la Nouvelle-Zélande ont fait un rapport au Cabinet 
relativement au brevetage du matériel génétique. Similairement, la Commission de réforme du droit 
de l’Australie a fait enquête sur les licences de matériel génétique et la santé humaine. Le conseil 
consultatif de la propriété intellectuelle a cherché à déterminer s’il y a lieu de développer une 
nouvelle défense en matière des utilisations et des recherches expérimentales.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Genius of Junk is the story of how Malcolm Simons turned Junk into gold, 
enflaming one of the greatest controversies of our time—the control and 
ownership of our genetic material. […] This is also a story of genius and 
character. Malcolm Simons had the genius to realise that the non-coding part 
of our dnA wasn’t in fact the junk dnA that many scientists had labelled it, 
but vital to the processes of life. And he has a character that fits the cliché of 
the eccentric scientist—brilliant at his work but hopeless with everyday life.1
GeneType was founded in 1989 by immunologist dr Malcolm Simons 
and medical practitioner dr Mervyn Jacobson. Their website provides this 
foundation story:
GeneType was founded in 1989 when dr. Malcolm Simons (an immuno-
geneticist) and dr. Mervyn Jacobson (a medical practitioner) met in Melbourne, 
Australia, and resolved to prove the non-coding (“junk” dnA) region of the 
human HLA gene complex [the human leukocyte antigen system] on 
chromosome 6 is in reality not “junk,” but in fact a valuable and highly 
ordered reservoir of useful genetic information, largely overlooked by the rest 
of the world. The commercial mission then evolved that Gene Type would 
seek exclusive ownership over access to this important genetic information 
and ultimately, to exploit it globally for profit.2
Genetic Technologies Limited (GTG) was the result of a merger in 
2000 between the original holding company, the private Swiss-owned 
1. “Genius of Junk (DNA),” Catalyst (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10 July 2003), <http://www.abc.net.
au/catalyst/stories/s898887.htm> [“Genius of Junk (DNA)”].
2. Genetic Technologies Limited, “Corporate Details” (February 2003), available at: <http://web.archive.org/
web/20030207163028/www.gtg.com.au/CorpDetails.html>.
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GeneType AG, and a publicly listed Australian company, duketon Goldfields 
Limited.3 After the corporate restructuring, GTG set a new goal of conversion 
to a biotechnology company.
GTG was able to obtain broad patents on a range of scientific inventions 
arising out of the work of Malcolm Simons.4 Most significantly, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) awarded US Patent no. 5,612,179 to GTG 
for an invention entitled “Intron sequence analysis method for detection of 
adjacent and remote locus alleles as haplotypes.”5 Furthermore, the USPTO also 
issued US Patent no. 5,851,762 to GTG for an invention entitled “Genomic 
mapping method by direct haplotyping using intron sequence analysis.”6 The 
company has also applied for patents in respect of foetal cell recovery, retroviral-
immuno therapy, and an AcTn3 genotype screen for athletic performance.7 
Jacobson comments with the following:
People, with our cooperation, developed things for everything from cattle to 
cats and plants to show that what was discovered in HLA was not the 
exception but the paradigm. “It was a very visionary patent attorney who 
recognised how to use the rules of the patent process to apply our work to 
genes in all species.”8
A wide spectrum of the community could be affected by the patents 
related to non-coding dnA. GTG asserts that its genomic mapping methods can 
deal with monogenic diseases such as cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anaemia, and 
beta-thalassemia. Furthermore, it suggests that its markers can help identify 
multigenic diseases such as diabetes, colon cancer, and breast and ovarian 
cancer. In addition to identifying individuals at risk for genetic diseases, GTG 
argues that its patented inventions could be used in respect of forensics and 
paternity testing. The company also asserts that the patents have wider 
implications for agriculture because they are relevant to the genetic testing of 
plants and animals.9 
GTG is the holding company of several subsidiaries including GeneType 
Pty Limited, Simons GeneType diagnostics Pty Limited, Genetic Technologies 
corporation Pty Limited, Silbase Scientific Services Pty Limited, Rarecellect 
Limited, ImmunAid Pty Limited, AgGenomics Pty Limited, GeneType AG, and 
GeneType corporation. Another potential opportunity for growth comes from 
3. See Table 1 below.
4. See Table 2 below.
5. Malcolm Simons, “Intron sequence analysis method for detection of adjacent and remote locus alleles as 
haplotypes,” US Patent No. 5,612,179, filed 23 September 1992, granted 18 March 1997, <http://patimg2.
uspto.gov/.piw?docid=US005612179& idkey=NONE> [“Non-coding DNA” patent]. 
6. Malcolm Simons, “Genomic mapping method by direct haplotyping using intron sequence analysis,” US 
Patent No. 5,851,762, filed 22 August 1994, granted 22 December 1998, <http://patimg2.uspto.gov/.piw?Do
cid=US005851762&idkey=NONE> [“Genomic mapping method” patent].
7. The principal applications in these patent families include: Rarecell project, US Patent Nos. 5153117 and 
5447842, and US Patent Applications 10/516,430 and 10/547,721 (Pending), Immunaid project, Australia 
Patent Applications, 2003905858 and 2004905118; and ACTN3 genotype screen for athletic performance, 
earliest priority date 16 September 2002, US Patent Application, 2003258390 (Pending). For a full list of the 
company’s patent holdings, see Genetic Technologies Limited, “Intellectual Property,” <http://www.gtg.
com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.190.010>.
8. David Binning, “Laws of Uncertainty,” Australian Biotechnology News (8 November 2002), <http://www.
biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=287719467> [Binning, “Laws of Uncertainty”].
9. See Detailed Description of the “Genomic mapping method” patent, supra note 6, col. 8, lines 22–23.
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GTG’s 75.8 percent share of canadian subsidiary GTech, a Vancouver-listed 
former mining company, which is also looking to convert to a biotechnology 
focus in the near future.10
Long-term, GTG aspires to become a comprehensive centre for “genetic 
testing business in the Asia Pacific region.”11 With entrepreneurial bravado, 
Jacobson predicted: “Our mission in relation to service testing now is to become 
the leading genetic testing facility in the Asia-Pacific region—the biggest and the 
best.”12 Since the 1990s, the company has provided genetic testing in the field 
of disputed paternity. It currently provides paternity testing services to 
Queensland Legal Aid. AgGenomics Pty Ltd., the joint venture with Agriculture 
Victoria Services Pty Ltd., provides genetic testing and genomic services at the 
Plant Biotechnology centre at La Trobe University, focussing mainly on plant and 
agricultural opportunities. In October 2002, GTG joined with Myriad to announce 
a strategic alliance in comprehensive cancer susceptibility testing. GTG would 
offer such testing in Australia, new Zealand, and South East Asia, and Myriad 
would offer such testing in the rest of the world. In 2004, GTG announced that 
it would provide forensic testing at its laboratory services.13 In 2005, GTG was 
listed on the nASdAQ, a move which the company hopes will give it access to 
capital markets in the US.14 The company has also enlisted the former Australian 
treasurer, John dawkins, as a director.15 
controversially, GTG has demanded large licence fees from private 
companies for access to its patents in respect of non-coding and genomic 
mapping.16 The Australian firm has issued twenty-seven commercial licences to 
biotechnology companies. The licences cover a range of activities, including 
plant genomics; animal testing; human genetic diagnostics; paternity and 
pathology testing; and the development of reagents. The licensees originate 
from the United States, canada, the European Union, Australia, and new 
Zealand. However, this aggressive licensing strategy has met with some 
resistance. Several United States companies—including Myriad Genetics, nuvelo 
Inc., covance Inc., Labcorp, and Applera—initially brought legal action against 
GTG before reaching a settlement.17 There has also been legal action over the 
validity of the patents of GTG in new Zealand. After being asked to pay 
considerable patent royalties, the Auckland district Health Board brought an 
action against GTG, alleging groundless threats of legal proceedings. The matter 
was withdrawn after mediation, with the parties bearing their respective costs. 
10. Genetic Technologies Limited, Annual Report 2005, <http://esvc001057.wic005u.server-web.com/
archives/1/070.130/822/Release%20of%202005%20Annual%20Report.pdf> at p. 29 [GTG, Annual Report 
2005]. 
11. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG reports growth in revenue from Genetic Testing” (23 July 2004), 
<http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=155> [GTG, “Growth in Revenue from 
Genetic Testing”]. 
12. Melissa Trudinger, “BIO Profile: Mervyn Jacobson, Genetic Technologies,” Australian Biotechnology News 
(1 June 2004), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=218823635> [Trudinger, “BIO Profile: Mervyn 
Jacobson”]. 
13. GTG, “Growth in Revenue from Genetic Testing,” supra note 11.
14. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG celebrates NASDAQ listing with the ringing of the Stock Market 
Closing Bell” (7 November 2005), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=292&func
tion=NewsArticle>. 
15. Genetic Technologies Limited, “John Dawkins Joins GTG Board of Directors” (25 November 2004), <http://
www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=174>.
16. See Table 3 below.
17. See Table 4 below.
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However, a number of crown Research Institutes in new Zealand agreed to pay 
commercial licensee fees to GTG.18
GTG has encouraged universities and research institutions to take out 
research licences to use its patents on non-coding dnA and genomic mapping. 
In response, public researchers have raised doubts about the inventiveness of 
the patents held by GTG. The leaders of the public consortium of the Human 
Genome Project were particularly vocal in their concerns. The director of the US 
national Human Genome Research Institute, dr Francis collins, condemned the 
privatisation of the human genome through the patent system. He observed that 
GTG had broken with a scientific tradition to provide free access to patented 
materials to academics conducting basic research:
The real question, it seems to me—“Is this good for the public?” If pursuing 
an aggressive stance with this patent slows down the progress of scientific 
research, then the public is injured and you and I should object.19
 
Similarly, his colleague, British nobel Laureate Sir John Sulston, the former 
director of the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute, argued that enforcing the 
patents was “going to be obviously extremely destructive.”20 He observed, “it’s 
going to prevent a lot of important work in health care.”21 His concern was that 
science was swinging more towards the profit motive, which was destroying 
credibility and trust.
This article considers the recent international controversy over the 
patents held by GTG in respect of non-coding dnA and genomic mapping.22 It 
questions whether Simons is a “genius of junk,” and whether his patents have 
the requisite novelty and inventiveness, according to the scientific knowledge at 
that time. Part 2 considers the licensing strategy of GTG, in particular the cross-
licensing agreements with Myriad and Myriad’s recent setbacks in Europe where 
the European Patent Office (EPO) has revoked one of its patents dealing with 
Breast cancer Gene 1 [BRcA1], and awarded Michael Stratton and cancer 
Research UK a patent dealing with Breast cancer Gene 1 [BRcA2]. Myriad may 
appeal such decisions. Part 3 focuses on the litigation between GTG and 
Applera. In the United States, GTG brought a legal action for patent infringement 
against Applera and its subsidiaries. Applera denied such allegations and 
18. Genetic Technologies Limited, “Mediation in New Zealand Results in Final Settlement of Legal Action” (7 
July 2005), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=244&function=NewsArticle>.
19. Jonathan Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” Four Corners (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 11 August 
2003), transcript, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s922059.htm> [Holmes, 
“Patently a Problem”]. 
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. 
22. This case study is part of the larger policy debate over gene patents. There is a large literature on this topic. 
See Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research,” (1998) 280:5364 Science 698, <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698>; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA, A Discussion Paper (London: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2002), <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/patentingdna/publication_310.html>; 
Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, “Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing 
the Australian Industry,” Occasional Paper No. 6 (Centre for Law and Genetics, University of Tasmania, 
2003), <http://www.ipria.org/publications/workingpapers/BiotechReportFinal.pdf>; Centre for Intellectual 
Property Policy [Richard Gold et al.], Genetic Patents and Health Care in Canada: An International 
Comparison of Patent Regimes of Canada and its Major Trading Partners (Montreal: McGill Centre for 
Intellectual Property Policy, 2005), <http://www.cipp.mcgill.ca/data/publications/00000015.pdf>. 
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counterclaimed that the patents of GTG were invalid because they failed to 
comply with the requirements of US patent law such as novelty, inventive step, 
and written specifications. The matter was eventually settled. Part 4 examines 
parallel litigation in new Zealand. In new Zealand, the Auckland district Health 
Board brought an action against GTG in the Auckland High court (in which it 
questioned the validity of the patents, claiming that it did not infringe such 
patents), and the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Economic development 
have reported to cabinet on the issues relating to the patenting of genetic 
material.23 Part 5 considers the policy developments resulting from the 
controversy over patent law and non-coding dnA in Australia. The Australian 
Law Reform commission (ALRc) has undertaken an inquiry into gene patents 
and human health,24 and the Advisory council on Intellectual Property (AcIP) is 
considering whether there should be a new defence in respect of experimental 
use and research.25
*
2. MyRIAD GIfTS: COMMERCIAL LICENCES AND PEPPERCORN RENTS
at the first annual general meeting in november 2000, Jacobson reported 
to GTG stockholders that “the strategy was to licence the GeneType patents—
especially the so-called ‘non-coding’ patents, in order to generate future revenue 
for GTG.”26 In the company’s 2001 Annual Report, Jacobson observed that 
“some companies typically deny they need a licence from GTG—but significantly, 
they cannot explain how else they might achieve the results they now seek.”27 He 
remarked, “[i]t has recently been suggested that in order to expedite these 
negotiations, GTG should now take a hard line with at least one potential 
licensee, given the prevailing view that most companies do not want to be the 
first to take a license to new technology.”28 
In 2001, GTG obtained patent insurance from General Electric 
Reinsurance. Jacobson explains the precautionary motivation behind the 
company seeking such insurance in the biotechnology industry:
23. New Zealand, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Commerce, Memorandum to Cabinet Policy Committee: 
Report Back with Recommendations and Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents (May 2004), 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____1148.aspx> [Options for Addressing 
Genetic Material Patents].
24. Australian Law Reform Commission, “Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Issue Paper 27 (Sydney: 
Australian Commonwealth, July 2003), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/27/> 
[“Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Issue Paper]; Australian Law Reform Commission, “Gene Patenting 
and Human Health,” Discussion Paper 68 (Sydney: Australian Commonwealth, February 2004), <http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/68/> [“Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Discussion Paper]; 
and Australian Law Reform Commission, “Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health,” 
Report 99 (Sydney: Australian Commonwealth, June 2004), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/
publications/reports/99> [“Genes and Ingenuity”].
25. Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, “Patents and Experimental Use,” Options Paper (Canberra: 
Commonwealth Government, 2004), <http://www.acip.gov.au/library/Experimental%20Use%20Options%20
Paper%20A.pdf> [“Patents and Experimental Use”].
26. Genetic Technologies Limited, Annual Report 2001, <http://admin.gtg.net.au/archives/1/070.040/190/2001G
TGAnnualReport.pdf> at p. 3 [GTG, Annual Report 2001].
27. Ibid at p. 4.
28. Ibid at p. 4. 
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Typically […] the big companies would dismiss the small companies, ignore it 
or if it became a nuisance it may well enter into some legal interaction 
whereby they would just exhaust that little company financially. For a major 
multinational biotech to spend $5 or $6 million to get rid of a threat is 
probably not a big deal. For the little biotech company, it may be the end of 
the road, their destruction. So we had the foresight in the early days to take 
out what’s called patent insurance, that our patents, once issued, would be 
insured and if we indeed had to enter into some legal dispute with larger 
companies, that to a degree the playing field would be levelled, the costs of 
prosecuting our patents and proving that they are infringing and they need a 
licence is covered by the insurer. So we don’t run the risk of wiping ourselves 
out in the process.29
Jacobson is somewhat coy about the nature of this policy, claiming that he 
cannot reveal the terms of the agreement. He could only confirm that the policy 
was very expensive, noting “it was a significant investment for us as a small 
group at the time but was deemed to be a prudent investment and with 
hindsight, was a wise decision.”30 The scope of the patent insurance is a mystery; 
it remains to be seen whether it would fully cover the costs of any patent 
infringement action. There has been much wider discussion over the costs 
associated with offensive and defensive insurance coverage for patent 
infringement.31 According to the 2004 annual report, the insurance policy has 
since expired.32 It is unclear whether GTG has been successful in obtaining a new 
insurance policy in respect of patent infringement.
In May 2003, GTG reported that it had identified 1783 potential 
licensees, such as genomics companies, genetic testing firms, developers of 
diagnostic devices, pharmaceutical and bioinformatics companies, owners of 
proprietary genes and genetic researchers.33 It alleged that at least 475 groups 
had already infringed the patents. The company emphasised that it was pursuing 
“several new opportunities protected by its [GeneType’s] patents in the areas of 
human, animal and plant genetic diagnostics and genomics.”34 In particular, 
short-term priorities would be “the licensing of the non-coding sequence 
patents, reduction to practice of the foetal cell patents and the expansion of the 
service testing business,” as well as the possibility of collaborating “with other 
scientific groups to commence suitably promising opportunities in biotechnology, 
both in Australia and overseas.”35
Jacobson comments: “It’s all about being creative [with the licensing 
terms]—every licensing deal we make is different, unique.”36 GTG developed a 
29. Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Dr Mervyn Jacobson” (11 August 2003), <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/
content/2003/20030811_patent/int_jacobson.htm> [Holmes, “Interview with Dr Mervyn Jacobson”].
30. Ibid.
31. Lisa Small, “Offensive and Defensive Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement Litigation: Who will Pay?” 
(1998) 16:2–3 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 707, <http://www.cardozoaelj.net/issues/98 
/Small.pdf>.
32. Genetic Technologies Limited, Annual Report 2004, <http://esvc001057.wic005u.server-web.com/
archives/1/070.040/190/GTG%20AR%2004.pdf> at p. 10.
33. Guy Nolch, “King of Junk DNA Files New Patents,” (2003) 24:7 Australasian Science 4.
34. GTG, Annual Report 2001, supra note 26 at p. 3.
35. Ibid.
36. Trudinger, “BIO Profile: Mervyn Jacobson,” supra note 12. 
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two-tier scheme for the licensing of its patents related to non-coding dnA and 
genomic mapping. The company would offer a commercial licence to private 
biotechnology companies in order to generate revenue. The firm would offer a 
research licence to public entities for a lower, and, in some cases, nominal fee. GTG 
maintained that the company sought to encourage as many users of its patented 
inventions as possible and thus was willing to provide licences to all users.37 
2.1.  Commercial Licences
GTG has issued twenty-seven commercial licences to a range of companies. The 
commercial licences cover a range of activities in the field of genomics and bio-
technology: human genetic diagnostics; paternity and pathology testing; the 
development of reagents and biochips; genetic testing of livestock and aqua-
culture; and, plant genomics. The majority of the companies are from the United 
States, including Sequenom Inc., nanogen Inc., Perlegen Sciences Inc., Myriad, 
ARUP, Orchid Biosciences Inc., Quest diagnostics Limited, and Laboratory 
corporation of the United States. One of the American companies, Inguran, has 
a substantial business in Latin America. There is one licensee from canada: TM 
Biosciences corporation. There are also a couple of European representatives: 
Pyrosequencing AB from Sweden and Innogenetics nV of Belgium. There are 
few licensees from Australia and new Zealand. The value of the commercial 
licences ranged from AU$125,000 to AU$15 million.  However, many of the 
arrangements remain confidential.38
Such commercial licences have been controversial. On 31 January 2002, 
Sequenom Inc., a discovery genetics company interested in the development of 
products to determine the medical impact of genes and genetic variation, was 
granted a non-exclusive licence over the GeneType non-coding patents for 
genomic mapping and intron sequence analysis effective from 5 April 2002. The 
licence includes the use of SnPs, mutations, and markers located in the non-
coding dnA. Under the licence, Sequenom will pay at least AU$1 million in 
upfront licence fees. Sequenom has been assured that future licences to other 
companies will not be for less than what they paid.39 
However, dr charles cantor, the chief Scientific Officer of Sequenom 
Inc., was uncomplimentary about the methods of GTG:
It’s very hard to disable an issued patent. While I didn’t think the patent was 
terribly strong—it wasn’t an absolutely clear-cut case—in my view it would be 
a protracted court fight. I felt we would win it in the end, but it wasn’t worth 
it. What made the license attractive is that we had the ability to pass on the 
sublicense to our customers. This meant that people who use things that read 
more closely on the patent would still be able to get access to the patent.40
37. Ibid. 
38. See Table 3. 
39. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Secures $1 Million License from Sequenom” (8 April 2002), <http://
www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.200.020.010&artid=221>.
40. “A Patent’s Place,” Bio-IT World (13 August 2003), <http://www.bio-itworld.com/archive/081303/horizons_
aussie_sidebar_1.html> [“Patent’s Place”].
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cantor said in the Four Corners report: “The amount of pressure they put on us 
to come to a conclusion one way or another was […] blackmail.”41 He was 
conscious of the threat of litigation: “We’re going to take you to court and it’s 
going to cost you so much money to defend yourself that you’re better off just 
paying us what we’re asking for and we’ll go away and you’ll never hear from us 
again.”42
On 17 november 2003, [GTG] reported that the lawsuits filed by GTG against 
US biotechnology companies, nuvelo, Inc., and covance, Inc., in March 2003 
for infringement against the GTG patents, had been finally settled by 
negotiations between the parties. [GTG reported] that the US district court 
for the northern district of california formally dismissed these lawsuits—at 
the request of the parties. Again, the specific details of the agreed settlements 
negotiated between GTG and the other parties […] remain confidential.43 
 On 9 February 2004, GTG reported that Labcorp had obtained a 
commercial licence.44 Initially, Labcorp filed a declaratory judgment action 
against GTG in the US district court for the district of new Jersey; however, 
having obtained a licence from GTG, Labcorp withdrew its action.
In 2004, GTG announced the establishment of a broad strategic alliance 
with the cY O’connor ERAdE Village Foundation (cYO), a centre of biotechnology 
in Western Australia. Initially, five genetics and genomics projects will be selected 
for priority attention and GTG will provide AU$4.5 million to cYO, spread over 
five years, to help fund such research and the development of new intellectual 
property.45 
In 2006, GTG formed a strategic alliance with MetaMorphix Inc., a 
licensee to its non-coding patents.46 The two companies intend to engage in joint 
commercialization of research. GTG will introduce MetaMorphix’s new genetic 
tests for livestock and companion animals into Australia and new Zealand.  In 
particular, the company will focus upon horn-polling markers, which,“allow cattle 
breeders to identify and breed out cattle born with horns.”47
In 2006, GTG has sought to expand its global licensing program by 
recruiting additional resources, including additional licensing staff and legal 
support teams. The company has “appointed the firm of PatentBridge LLc, 
based in Silicon Valley, california, to seek out licensing opportunities in the 
USA.”48 GTG has also “appointed the London-based law firm of SJ Berwin LLP 
to support its licensing program in Europe.”49 
41. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” supra note 19.
42. Ibid.
43. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Law Suits Against Nuvelo and Covance Now Dismissed” (8 December 
2003), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=63>.
44. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Grants License to LabCorp, of USA” (9 Feburary 2004), <http://www.
gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=78>.
45. Graeme O’Neill, “GTG firms up O’Connor partnership,” Australian Biotechnology News (16 June 2004), 
<http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=1636604791>.
46. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Announces Strategic Alliance with MetaMorphix, Inc.” (27 February 
2006), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=270&function=NewsArticle>.
47. Ibid.
48. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Expands Licensing Programme in USA” (27 January 2006), <http://
www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=268&function=NewsArticle>.
49.  Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Expands Licensing Programme to Europe” (21 February 2006), 
<http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=269&function=NewsArticle>. 
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2.2.  Research Licences
GTG has issued five research licences to a number of universities and public 
research institutions including the University of Sydney, the University of Technology 
Sydney, the University of Utah, colorado University, and King’s college.
The University of Sydney became the first research institution in Australia 
to obtain a research licence from GTG. “The fee of AU$1,500 charged by [GTG 
allows] university staff and students to use the so-called junk dnA in basic 
research for the remaining 15-year duration of the company’s patents.”50
Jacobson said that the fee for all the researchers in one institution for 
fifteen years was a “peppercorn” amount.51 
The deputy director of the University of Sydney’s Business Liaison Office and 
the Manager of the Intellectual Property and Licensing Unit, Kevin croft, said 
that the university was pleased to have negotiated a low-cost deal after being 
informed by the company that its scientists were infringing the patents. “The 
mutually beneficial terms of the licence ensure that the university researchers 
are able to pursue their research with the full support of Genetic Technologies 
for minimal cost.” Mr croft said the tradition of academics not requiring a 
research licence in such circumstances had “no law to defend it.”52
In a submission to the AcIP, croft provided a defence of the University’s 
decision: 
While much was made of this in the press and I received a number of 
comments from researchers at the time, the licence terms, including the fee, 
were judged not to be onerous or constraining and the existence of the 
licence provided certainty for a number of researchers.53 
 
croft was of the belief that there was no need for the establishment of a research 
exemption. He observed that “there appears to be neither need, nor benefit to be 
achieved, in implementing changes to the patent law that would provide for a 
significantly more liberal right for non-owners to undertake experiments using 
patented technologies.”54 nonetheless, it should be noted that researchers and 
scientists at the University of Sydney do not share this point of view. It remains to be 
seen whether other members of the Group of Eight—an elite coterie of Australian 
universities—will obtain licences in respect of non-coding dnA.
50. Deborah Smith, “DNA Scientists Happy To Buy Junk,” The Sydney Morning Herald (4 August 2003),  
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/03/1059849278757.html>.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Letter from Kevin Croft to Dr Rod Crawford (April 2004), <http://www.acip.gov.au/expusesubs/Kevin%20
Croft,%20Uni%20of%20Sydney.pdf>. 
54. Ibid.
550  university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
defending such licensing practices, GTG cites such precedents as the 
cohen Boyer patent on recombinant dnA55 and the Mullis patent on the 
polymerase chain reaction (PcR).56 
GTG cites the decision in Madey v. Duke University to support its 
contention that educational institutions should enter into licensing agreements 
for the use of its patented technologies.57 It maintains that researchers and 
scientists are labouring under an erroneous belief that research is exempt from 
patent claims for infringement:
There is a widespread, but largely erroneous belief that research is somehow 
exempt from honouring or respecting its obligations under patent law. 
Interestingly, this misunderstanding is being redressed rather dramatically in 
the US currently through the case of Madey v. duke University. In Madey v. 
duke University the US Supreme court clearly indicated that research of the 
type occurring in almost all academic biomedical labs is not exempt from 
patent liability. The court noted that to qualify as a pure research use, and 
thus have a defence against patent infringement, the use would have to be 
[“]solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
enquiry”; in other words, the court substantially narrowed the definition of the 
research that can be regarded as free of a “commercial” flavour. By 
implication, the vast majority of scientific research occurring in universities, 
research organisations and not-for-profit institutes would be regarded by the 
courts broadly as subject to patent liability.58
This gloss on the case is not strictly accurate. The US court of Appeals 
for the Federal circuit made the decisive ruling in Madey v. Duke University. The 
Supreme court of the United States did not make a judgment on Madey v. Duke 
University; it refused special leave to appeal.59 The implication drawn from the 
case by GTG is contentious. The court of Appeals for the Federal circuit 
judgment is a United States authority; it may well not be a persuasive precedent 
55. For a history of the Cohen-Boyer patent, see Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars Out Of DNA: The First Major 
Project In Biotechnology And The Commercialization Of Molecular Biology, 1974–1980,” (2001) 92:3 Isis 541.
56. For a history of the PCR patent, see Paul Rabinow, Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
57. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed Circ 2002), <http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/
fed/opinions/01opinions/01-1567.html> [Madey]; for a summary of the debate over patent law and 
experimental use, see Matthew Rimmer, “The Freedom to Tinker: Patent Law and Experimental Use,” (2005) 
15:2 Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Patents 167 [Rimmer, “Freedom to Tinker”]. 
58. Genetic Technologies Limited, “To Medical and Scientific Colleagues” (21 July 2003), <http://www.gtg.com.
au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=97>.
59. However, the Supreme Court of the United States did consider the special “Bolar” exemption for 
pharmaceutical drugs contained in 35 U.S.C. s. 271(e)(1), <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/35C28. 
txt> in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I Ltd. et al., 545 U.S. 193, <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
opinions/04pdf/03-1237.pdf>, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that 
the safe harbour exempted from infringement all uses of patented compounds reasonably related to the 
process of developing information for submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or 
distribution of drugs. However, the Court declined to address issues with respect to the common law 
experimental use exemption and the effect of s. 271(e)(1) on research tools (see footnote 7 of the decision). 
For a commentary on the decision, see Yann Joly, “Integra v. Merck: The Resurrection of the American 
Research Exemption?” (June 2005).
 The Alchemy of Junk  551(2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 539
in other jurisdictions.60 Furthermore, it is presumptuous to conclude that the vast 
majority of public sector research would be regarded by the courts broadly as 
subject to patent liability.
In a number of forums, GTG has argued against the establishment of a 
defence of experimental use. It submitted to the ALRc: “A generic research 
exemption would totally devalue significant new inventions specifically directed 
towards assisting research.”61 GTG argued that it was difficult to draw a boundary 
between commercial research and pure research:
The question is where does public domain research stop and commercial 
research start. Whatever the answer is, the border is not the gates of the 
publicly funded research institutes; these entities are collectively the biggest 
patenters and licencers in the world. At the end the answer lies in jettisoning 
the idea of a research exemption and developing a standard form of research 
licence that would be readily granted by “all” patent holders for a nominal 
fee, but that would limit coverage to only certain types of activity. Activity 
beyond this limit would require a commercial licence.62
 
GTG noted, “Research organisations do not get their computers free, they do 
not get software from Microsoft free, nor do they get their chemical lab supplies, 
staff, space, equipment and utilities free of charge.”63 The company argued that 
a defence of experimental use would undermine the system of rewards in the 
patent system for those who invested in research and development. Similarly, the 
company was opposed to amendments to the Patents Act 199064 to include a 
defence for private, non-commercial use of a patented invention.65 
Some researchers were sceptical of GTG’s claim that it would only 
charge a “peppercorn” rent of AU$1,000 to researchers and research organisations 
in respect of the patents for non-coding dnA. Robert cook-deegan of duke 
University commented as follows:
60. Indeed, there is wide variation in the nature and scope of the patent defence of experimental use across 
jurisdictions. United States jurisprudence does not command universal respect.  In Micro Chemicals Ltd. v. 
Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corporation, [1972] S.C.R. 506, (1971) 25 D.L.R. (3d) 79, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that bona fide experiments with a drug do not constitute patent infringement. The 
European Union has sought to encourage harmonization amongst its member states in respect of the 
research exemption under patent law. Article 31 (b) of the Community Patent Convention has provided the 
basis for an experimental use exception, which exempts “acts done for experimental purposes relating to 
the subject-matter of the patented invention.” Convention for the European patent for the common market 
(Community Patent Convention (CPC)), 15 December 1975, [1976] O.J.L. 17/1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41975A3490:EN:HTML>, art. 31( b). German courts have held that the 
defence of experimental use can apply to both non-commercial and commercial uses, so long as the 
experimentation is on the patented invention: Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) I (Interferon Gamma), [1997] 
R.P.C. 623 (Fed Sup Ct of Germany) and Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II (Erythropoietin), [1998] R.P.C. 
423 (Fed Sup Ct of Germany). 
61. Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Discussion Paper, supra note 24 at para. 14.108.
62. Ibid. at para. 14.84.
63. Ibid. at para. 14.108.
64. Patents Acts 1990 (Cth), <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/1F75A43C9
34B3201CA2572020013B7D3?OpenDocument> [Patents Act 1990].
65. Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Discussion Paper, supra note 24 at para 14.114.
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Why would GTG go after university-based researchers, unless they’re planning 
on doing this with hundreds of universities? If they were doing what most 
companies do, they would not enforce the patent on universities. Going after 
universities, and thus increasing costs of research for everyone, is just the sort 
of thing people are worried about in the wake of duke v. Madey. If they choose 
to enforce the patent against companies and universities, the choices are to 
pay the license fees or try to kill the patent—sign up or take your chances in 
court. The third option—quietly ignoring the patent—is gone now.66
 
The academic suggested that such a licensing strategy could bolster support for 
the establishment of a broad statutory exemption for experimental use in the US 
and elsewhere.
Professor Francis collins was steadfast that, as a matter of principle, 
universities should not have to pay licence fees in respect of the non-coding 
dnA, even if they are for the token amount of AU$1,000. He feared that 
“academic researchers will find it very difficult to pursue their best and brightest 
ideas without a phalanx of lawyers at their elbow and that’s really not where we 
want to go.”67 collins commented as follows:
I am much more concerned about the company’s aggressive licensing strategy. 
The research exemption, while not codified by law in the U.S., is a tradition that 
normally protects academic researchers from charges of patent violation, 
based on the assumption that the public is best served by the free exercise of 
scientific creativity in the not-for-profit sector. If it turns out that GTG’s approach 
ends up blocking or restricting access to such broadly enabling technology, 
then that is of great concern to me and the entire genomics community. 
I hope that GTG will seriously consider making its invention freely available to 
anyone who wishes to use it for noncommercial purposes. Saying that the 
license fee is only a nominal sum is not reassuring—the legal requirements 
alone will be enough to scare off some users, [and] asking for any license fee 
at all starts one down a slippery slope toward significant restriction of 
academic research.68
 
collins admitted that there was no longer any bright line dividing basic science 
and applied research. nonetheless, he maintained that, for the most part, private 
companies had refrained from bringing patent infringement actions against 
researchers. collins observed that exceptional companies who threatened to 
take legal action against public researchers had received negative feedback: “It 
has not gone well, there has been an outcry from the scientific community and 
in fact from most of the private sector as well saying this is not the way to see 
progress go forward and in those instances ultimately the companies have 
66. “Patent’s Place,” supra note 40.
67. Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Professor Francis Collins,” Four Corners (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 9 July 2003), transcript, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030811_patent/int_
collins.htm> [Holmes, “Interview with Professor Francis Collins”]. 
68. “Patent’s Place,” supra note 40.
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backed off.”69 He would have preferred to see GTG follow the patent and 
licensing policy in the national Institutes of Health Research Tools guidelines.
2.3.   Cross-Licensing Agreement with Myriad Genetics
In 2002, GTG approached Myriad in respect of Myriad’s activities in intron 
sequence analysis and genomic mapping. GTG argued that the Utah company 
needed to obtain a licence if it did not want to infringe GTG’s patents.
In response, Myriad brought a lawsuit against GTG in the US district 
court for the district of Utah.70 The Utah company sought a declaratory judgment 
of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement with respect to US Patent 
nos. 5,612,179 and 5,841,762. Myriad argued that the patents were invalid, 
void, and unenforceable because the inventions were anticipated and obvious in 
light of other prior art and because they failed to meet the written description 
and enablement requirements of the US Patent Act.71 It also argued that GTG 
had made false and misleading statements to the USPTO with respect to issues 
material to patentability: “GTG, through discriminatory and anti-competitive 
licensing and attempts to license the patent in that GTG has demanded that 
Myriad pay licensing fees that are, upon information and belief, grossly out of 
proportion to the licensing fees paid to GTG by other licensees.”72 Furthermore, 
Myriad sought a permanent injunction to prevent GTG from “engaging in 
coercive tactics by threatening to confront Myriad’s research collaborators, 
licensees, and customers with charges of patent infringement.”73
Jacobson argued that “the lawsuit was a ploy by Myriad” to obtain a 
“tactical advantage” during the negotiation of the licence and protect itself in 
case there was a breakdown in the negotiations.74 
In the end, the claim was withdrawn without prejudice before the case 
ever got to the courtroom. Myriad paid US$1 million plus for licences to GTG’s 
key non-coding dnA analysis patents, and GTG and Myriad agreed that GTG 
would be Myriad’s exlusive marketing agent in Australia and new Zealand for 
Myriad’s medical diagnostics.75 The press release observed the following:
Under the terms of the agreement, Myriad will receive a broad, non-exclusive 
license to Genetic Technologies’ non-coding dnA analysis and mapping 
patents for all applications in human therapeutics and diagnostics. Genetic 
Technologies will become Myriad’s exclusive marketing agent in Australia and 
new Zealand for its world-leading predictive medicine products for a range 
of important diseases, including breast cancer, ovarian cancer, colon cancer, 
melanoma and hypertension. The testing for the breast and ovarian cancer 
69. Holmes, “Interview with Professor Francis Collins,” supra note 67.
70. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Myriad Genetics Inc. v. Genetic 
Technologies Limited, Civil No.: 2_02 CV-0964 BSJ (D Utah, filed 26 August 2002), 2002 WL 33950375 
[Myriad Complaint].
71. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. (2000), <http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_35.shtml>.
72. Myriad Complaint, supra note 70 at para. 28.
73. Ibid. at para. 44.
74. Melissa Trudinger, “GTG suing Applera, Covance over patent infringement,” Australian Biotechnology 
News (11 September 2003), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=1871349860>.
75. Genetic Technologies Limited, “Genetic Technologies and Myriad Genetics Announce Strategic Licensing 
Agreement” (28 October 2002), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=126>.
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will be offered through Genetic Technologies’ state-of-the-art testing facilities 
in Melbourne, Australia. The other predictive medicine products will be 
performed by Myriad in its laboratory in the United States. Myriad has 
granted Genetic Technologies an option to perform the other tests in 
Melbourne upon future payment of agreed fees and royalties.76
 
After the announcement of this cross-licensing deal, GTG stressed that it was the 
only lawful provider of genetic testing held by Myriad in Australia. It emphasized 
that other service providers were guilty of patent infringement. Jacobson said 
genetic tests available in Australia at the time were being provided by “‘entities 
who have chosen to set up without any license or approval’ of the patent 
owner.”77 He observed, “[u]nder the law, if it’s patented and you use it without 
the licence, it is patent infringement, it’s breaking the law.”78
Following the cross-licensing deal, the public affairs program 60 Minutes 
aired a critical program on GTG called “The Profit Motive.”79 The episode 
generated dismay and concern among the wider public. In response, GTG 
announced that it would not enforce the patents on BRcA1 and BRcA2 in 
Australia. A press release said,  
GTG also announced that the intellectual property rights it had obtained from 
Myriad for breast cancer susceptibility testing will not be enforced by GTG 
against other service providers in Australia and new Zealand—and were a gift 
from GTG to the people of Australia and new Zealand.80 
 
The ALRc suggested that the company has now been estopped from taking 
legal action because of its public statements.81
 However, there remains some ambiguity about the status of this “gift.” 
GTG is only the exclusive licensee of the genetic tests in respect of breast cancer 
and ovarian cancer. Although the Melbourne company can certainly decide not 
to enforce the patents, it cannot bind the patent owner, Myriad Genetics. The 
Utah biotechnology company has not made any public undertakings that it will 
not enforce the patents in the context of Australia and new Zealand. It is 
possible that Myriad might still bring legal action for patent infringement in 
those jurisdictions. In any case, it should be recalled that the patents held by 
Myriad may be invalidated in legal proceedings. Ultimately, GTG and Myriad 
might not be in a position to “gift” BRcA1 and BRcA2; such genes could 
become global public goods. 
Moreover, the Four Corners report revealed that GTG will still be 
seeking royalties in respect of the use of its non-coding dnA patents. dr Graeme 
Suthers observes that the company has encumbered the “gift” with hidden 
costs:
76. Ibid.
77. Judy Skatssoon, “Row Erupts Over Genetic Patents,” Australian Associated Press (31 October 2002).
78. Ibid.
79. Liz Hayes & Nick Greenaway, “Profit Motive,” 60 Minutes (Channel Nine, 20 April 2003), <http://
sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/sixtyminutes/stories/2003_04_20/story_809.asp>.
80. Genetic Technologies Limited, “Genetic Susceptibility Testing—A Third Progress Report” (22 May 2003), 
<http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=102>.
81. “Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Discussion Paper, supra note 24.
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I’ve got mixed feelings about that. Because it may be that GTG has provided 
a generous gift of the BRAcA [sic, BRcA] licences to the Australian people. 
But they will take it back with the other hand by asking for licence fees for the 
non-coding patents which are essential for doing the [BRcA] analyses.82 
 
Furthermore, the costs associated with the use of the non-coding dnA patents 
are not the “peppercorn rents” GTG would like to suggest. A freedom-of-
information application revealed that the company was seeking substantial sums 
from the new Zealand Government for the use of the non-coding dnA patents.83 
Of course, this could have just been an ambit claim on the part of GTG. There is 
no evidence that this agreement has been finalized.
There are a number of possibilities why GTG decided to change tack 
and make public utterances that BRcA1 and BRcA2 would be given to the 
Australian public as a gift. Of course, it is difficult to second-guess internal 
corporate decisions. nonetheless, it is worthwhile to speculate why there was a 
volte-face on the part of the company. GTG might have been concerned about 
the public backlash after the media report aired on 60 Minutes. They could have 
decided to avoid further controversy over the particularly sensitive topic of 
breast cancer and ovarian cancer. It is possible that GTG could have been 
concerned about the legal challenges to the patents related to BRcA1 and 
BRcA2. The company may have decided that it would have a firmer legal 
position if they relied instead upon the non-coding dnA patents. Through 
making a gift of BRcA1 and BRcA2, GTG improved its bargaining position in the 
policy debate over gene patents and human health. The decision not to enforce 
the patents related to BRcA1 and BRcA2 would have strengthened the 
company’s defence of the status quo.
2.4.   Patent Revocation
In Europe, Myriad has recently suffered several setbacks. The European Patent 
Office has revoked one of its patents dealing with BRcA1, narrowed the scope 
of a couple of its patents dealing with BRcA1, and awarded Michael Stratton and 
cancer Research UK a patent dealing with BRcA2.84 Myriad may well appeal 
against such decisions and may also rely upon its licence from GTG to 
commercialize the patents with respect to non-coding dnA.
82. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” supra note 19.
83. Ibid.
84. The Institut Curie and its supporters have challenged Myriad Genetics’ patents: EP 699 754 (which was 
revoked), EP 705 902 and EP 705 903 (whose claims were narrowed), and EP 785 216 (the patent relating to 
BRCA2). Myriad Genetics has transferred some of its rights to the University of Utah Research Foundation.  
See Matthew Rimmer, “Myriad Genetics: Patent Law And Genetic Testing,” (2003) 25:1 European Intellectual 
Property Review 20; Andy Coghlan, “Europe revokes controversial gene patent,” New Scientist (19 May 2004), 
<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn5016.html>; Andrew Pollack, “Patent on Test for Cancer Is Revoked 
By Europe,” The New York Times 3 (19 May 2004) <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&re
s=9C01E7D6123FF93AA25756C0A9629C8B63>; Institut Curie, “The European Patent Office has revoked the 
Myriad patent,” Press Release (21 May 2004), <http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/190504_gb.pdf>; Cancer 
Research UK, “Charity to make breast cancer (BRCA2) gene freely available across Europe,” Press Release (11 
February 2004), <http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/news/pressreleases/2004/february/38944>; Susan Mayor, 
“Charity wins BRCA2 patent,” The Scientist (13 February 2004), <http://genomebiology.com/researchnews/
default.asp?arx_id=gb-spotlight-20040213-01>; European Patent Office, “Public opposition hearings on two 
genetic engineering patents (“breast cancer gene”) at the European Patent Office” (17 January 2005), 
<http://www.epo.org/about-us/press/releases/archive/2005/17012005.html>.
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GTG has been understandably anxious about the revocation of the 
patent held by Myriad in the European Union.85 Jacobson was quick to reassure 
the stock market that the decision of the EPO did not have any financial 
ramifications for the Melbourne company. He argued that the opposition to the 
patent held by Myriad was misconceived because it was based upon policy 
concerns about research and health care: “Another group of community 
organisations also filed, but its case was based more on concerns about the 
company’s attitude—its corporate style and its costing structure for the test.”86 
This gloss on the panel decision of the EPO seems somewhat hasty and 
misconceived. The Institut curie and its allies had opposed the patent of Myriad 
on formal grounds of criteria such as novelty, inventive step, and written 
description.87 It is inaccurate to claim that their concerns were policy objections. 
Furthermore, the managing director of GTG was not in a good position to 
second guess the decision of the EPO, because it had not handed down its 
written decision at the time of the comments. 
Jacobson stressed that the decision does not affect Myriad’s two other 
European patents on the BRcA1 test, and he expressed confidence that Myriad 
could win an appeal against the panel decision of the European Union. He 
argued that, in any case, Myriad could rely upon its licence to commercialize the 
patents with respect to non-coding dnA. Jacobson observes the following:
It may well be that Myriad is appreciative of having access to patents like ours. 
It may well be that their plans in Europe are dependent to some degree on 
our support for their parents [sic, patents]. It’s just an example of the need to 
be incredibly stringent in following the rules precisely, which is what we have 
done with our patents.88
 
Thus, Myriad has a fall-back position, in the event that it loses an appeal in the 
EPO. Under its agreement with GTG, it has the right to commercialise GTG’s 
non-coding dnA patents in Europe, at least as they apply to the BRcA1 and 
BRcA2 genes.
*
3. JUNkyARD DOGS: GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED v. 
APPLERA CORPORATION
on 26 march 2003, gtg filed a patent infringement action in the US district 
court for the northern district of california against the major life sciences 
company, Applera, and its subsidiaries: Applied Biosystems Group, the celera 
85. Graeme O’Neill, “How Myriad’s GCAT got out of the bag,” Australian Biotechnology News (21 June 2004), 
<http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=202026907> [O’Neil, “GCAT out of the bag”]; Graeme 
O’Neill, “EU patent snatchback won’t affect GTG: Jacobson,” Australian Biotechnology News (21 May 
2004), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=213369704>.
86. O’Neil, “GCAT out of the bag,” ibid.
87. Institut Curie, “The Institut Curie, the Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris and the Institut Gustave-Roussy 
file a joint opposition notice to the Myriad Genetics patent with the European Patent Office,” Press Release 
(10 October, 2001), <http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/myriadopposition10oct01_gb.pdf>.
88. O’Neil, “GCAT out of the bag,” supra note 85.
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Genomics Group, and celera diagnostics.89 The complaint alleged that the 
companies were infringing US Patent no. 5,612,179, entitled “Intron Sequence 
Analysis Method for detection of Adjacent and Remote Locus Alleles as 
Haplotypes.”90 The allegedly infringing products were cystic fibrosis reagent kits 
sold through celera diagnostics, and products “relating to methods of analysis 
of non-coding sequence variants.”91 The complaint also alleged that the 
companies in the Applera Group were infringing US Patent no. 5,851,762.92 GTG 
sought “monetary damages, costs, expenses, injunctive relief, and other relief as 
the court deems proper.”93 
3.1.  Applera Activities
Applera was a troublesome and tenacious adversary for GTG. As a large, well-
resourced biotechnology company with substantial legal expertise, it had great 
experience in filing, prosecuting, and litigating patents.94 
Applera and its subsidiaries have accumulated a large number of 
patents. Applied Biosystems has obtained 700 patents and has another 1,200 
patents pending in jurisdictions around the world.95 In an amicus curiae brief in 
the Festo case, the counsel for Applera acknowledged the following:
As a leader in the biotechnology field, Applera operates in a technologically 
dense environment. not surprisingly, patent rights play an important role in 
its businesses. To be clear, Applera holds key patent rights and has been, and 
is, involved in litigation where it is the patent-holder. Likewise, as a successful 
company with substantial market share, Applera is the target of patent claims 
and has been, and is involved in litigation where it is the accused infringer. 
Applera merely seeks clear and certain rules that encourage and reward 
innovation by reinforcing the respect for legitimate patent rights, while also 
ensuring that the scope of the patent rights of others is clear to those wishing 
to enter or advance in a particular field.96
 
Applera has been a stout enforcer of its patents. The corporate group spent 
US$17.6 million on legal fees in the first nine months of 2004.97 “‘They’re not 
shrinking violets,’ said a lawyer who worked with them.”98 The corporate group 
89. First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement, Genetic Technologies Limited v. Applera Corporation, 
No. C-03-1316 PJH (ND Cal, 11 August 2003), 2003 WL 23796523 [GTG, First Amended Complaint for Patent 
Infringement].
90. Ibid. 
91. Ibid. at Introduction.
92. “Genomic mapping method” patent, supra note 6.
93. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of  the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 for Applera Corporation” 
(Washington, DC: March 2003), <http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/ABI/reports/10q_q3_2003.
pdf> at p. 16.
94. Ibid. at p. 14.
95. Alan Cohen, “Going, Going...,” (2004) 4:7 IP Law and Business 30 [Cohen, “Going, Going…”].  
96. Brief of Amicus Curiae Applera Corporation in support of the respondents, Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd, <http://latimes.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/00-1543/00-1543.pet.
ami.applera.pdf> at p. 1.
97. Cohen, “Going, Going…,”supra note 95. 
98. Ibid. 
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has been the subject of a number of patent lawsuits.99 Applera recognized the 
risks associated with such litigation in an annual report: “There has been 
substantial litigation regarding patents and other intellectual property rights in 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.”100 
In its complaint, GTG detailed a number of allegedly infringing activities 
on the part of the Applera corporation. First, the Applera Genome Initiative is 
engaged in the identification and selection of approximately 200,000 SnPs 
located in genes or gene-regulatory regions, and the validation of approximately 
90 sets of human dnA, by generating individual genotypes and allele frequency 
data.101 The Initiative compares genotypes and gene expression profiles from 
healthy and diseased populations to identify and validate new markers for 
incorporation into molecular diagnostic tests. It also provides a framework for 
the haplotype map of the human genome. GTG alleged that such activities fall 
within the scope of its patents.
Second, Applied Biosystems develops and markets instrument-based 
systems, reagents, software, and contract services to the life science industry and 
research community. commercial products include the Assays-on-demand SnP 
Genotyping kits, the Assays-by-design SnP Genotyping kits, and the celera 
discovery System. GTG argues that such products involve the use of non-coding 
dnA with such conduct falling within the scope of its patents: “Use of the 
Assays-on-demand SnP Genotyping kits and the Assays-by-design SnP 
Genotyping kits involves amplification of genomic dnA with primer pairs.”102
Third, celera diagnostics is involved in the discovery, development, and 
commercialization of diagnostic products. One of the commercial molecular 
diagnostic test products offered for sale is the cystic Fibrosis ASR product. GTG 
alleged, “Several of the mutations or polymorphisms tested by the cystic 
Fibrosis ASR kit are non-coding sequence variants that are characteristic of one 
or more coding region alleles of the cystic Fibrosis locus.”103 celera diagnostics 
is also collaborating in the study of genes for use in the diagnosis and treatment 
of a variety of diseases. This project includes analysis of genetic variation 
associated with approximately 1,000 SnPs in over 3,000 clinically defined 
samples. celera diagnostics is also engaged in research to establish the clinical 
utility of laboratory tests based on diagnostic markers for a variety of diseases 
and cancers. Such tests relate to cardiovascular disease, diabetes, Alzheimer’s 
disease, breast cancer, and prostate cancer. 
Fourth, Applera and its operating divisions are involved in commercial 
relationships to detect, identify, and determine the chromosomal locations of 
various genes associated with one or more traits. Such research includes work on 
disease genes, drug responsiveness genes, drug susceptibility genes, and quality 
trait loci. GTG alleged that “at least some of the studies involve the use of 
haplotyping to compare the haplotypes exhibited by a trait-bearing population 
99. Applera’s lawsuits have involved shareholders, competitor companies, and inventors who claim ownership 
of patents awarded to Applera or its subsidiaries. Applera Corporation, 2005 Annual Report, <http://www.
applera.com/annualreports/annual2005/AppleraAR05.pdf> at pp. 22, 29, 63, 72–74.
100. Applera Corporation, 2003 Annual Report, <http://www.applera.com/annualreports/annual2003/2003_
Applera_AR_lowres.pdf> at p. 49.
101. GTG, First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement, supra note 89.
102. Ibid. at para. 14.
103. Ibid. at para. 17.
 The Alchemy of Junk  559(2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 539
versus a general (control) population at multiple chromosomal regions.”104 Again, 
the Melbourne company asserted that such activities come within the scope of 
its patents.
Finally, celera Genomics is engaged in integrated advanced technologies 
to discover and develop new therapeutics by leveraging its capabilities in 
proteomics, bioinformatics, and genomics to identify and validate novel drug 
targets and to discover novel therapeutic candidates. GTG is concerned that 
celera Genomics participates in the commercialisation of diagnostic products 
based on its discoveries through celera diagnostics.
3.2.  Patent Infringement
GTG claimed that Applera has engaged in a number of activities which fall within 
the scope of US patent 5,612,179: 
Upon information and belief, Applera has designed, tested, manufactured, 
marketed, offered to sell, and sold its products and/or services, including, but 
not limited to the cystic Fibrosis ASR kit, the Assays-on-demandTM SnP 
Genotyping kits, the Assays-by-designSM SnP Genotyping kits, and the 
celera discovery System.105 
 
Furthermore, the company argued: “Upon information and belief, Applera has 
engaged in activities within the scope of the Applera Genome Initiative with full 
knowledge of the claims of the US patent 5,612,179, and with full knowledge of 
GTG’s rights therein.”106
Similarly, GTG argued that Applera had engaged in a number of 
activities that fall within the scope of US patent 5,851,762. It submitted that 
Applera had infringed the patent by undertaking activities in genomic haplotype 
analysis, including 
creating a haplotype map of the human genome; creating a haplotype map 
of the mouse genome; creating haplotype maps of genomic dnA of species 
other than mouse or human; and obtaining genomic dnA samples from 
individuals exhibiting a range of traits.107 
 
consequently, GTG argued that
Applera has designed, developed, tested, manufactured, marketed and used 
certain products and/or services relating to haplotype analysis of genomic 
dnA with full knowledge of the claims of the US patent 5,851,762, and with 
full knowledge of GTG’s rights therein.108
104.  Ibid. at para. 21.
105.  Ibid. at para. 25.
106.  Ibid. at para. 25.
107.  Ibid. at para. 32.
108.  Ibid. at para. 33.
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In its first claim of relief, GTG alleged that Applera has engaged in direct 
infringement of its patent rights in both the 5,612, 179 and the 5,851,762 
patents.109 The company observed:
Applera has developed, tested, manufactured, marketed, offered for sale, 
sold, and continues to develop, test, manufacture, market, offer for sale and 
sell certain products and/or services that infringe GTG’s rights in both the 
5,612,179 and the 5,851,762 patents. Applera’s direct infringement of both 
the 5,612, 179 and the 5,851,762 Patents has been with full knowledge of 
GTG’s rights therein.110 
 
GTG claims that it is suffering “irreparable harm” as a result of Applera’s 
continuing direct infringement of both the 5,612,179 and the 5,851,762 
patents.111 
In its second claim of relief, GTG asserts that Applera has induced third 
parties to infringe both patents112 in that it “has offered training, instruction or 
other advice to its customers, licensees or others in the use of its products and 
technology, including but not limited to the cystic Fibrosis ASR kit,” the Assays-
on-demandTM SnP Genotyping kits, the Assays-by-designSM SnP Genotyping 
kits, and the celera discovery System.113 It maintains that the alleged inducement 
of patent infringement was both “wilful and malicious.”114
In its third claim of relief, GTG further claims that Applera has been 
engaged in contributory patent infringement115 in having “manufactured, offered 
for sale, and sold certain products and/or services” that “constitute a material 
part of the inventions claimed in the ‘179 Patent.”116 It argued that “Applera’s 
products and/or services relating to non-coding sequence variation detection 
and haplotype analysis and the methods of their use are not staples of industry, 
and they are not commodities suitable for substantial non-infringing use.”117 It 
concluded: “As a result of Applera’s development, testing, manufacture and/or 
sale of its products and/or services, and as a result of its instruction, training or 
advice in the use of such products and/or services, Applera has contributorily 
infringed GTG’s rights in the ‘179 Patent.”118 It insisted that such contributory 
patent infringement was both “wilful and malicious.”119 
GTG has sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring Applera 
from engaging in all of these allegedly infringing activities. In addition to costs, 
GTG sought damages “in no event less than a reasonable royalty to GTG for the 
rights secured in both the ‘179 and the ‘762 Patents” and “treble damages in 
109. Ibid. at paras. 34, 35.
110. Ibid. at paras. 39, 40.
111. Ibid. at para. 44.
112. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Genetic Technologies Limited v. Applera Corporation, No. C 03-1316 
(ND Cal, 26 March 2003), 2003 WL 23794369 [GTG, Complaint for Patent Infringement]. 
113. Ibid. at para. 29.
114. Ibid. at para. 35.
115. GTG, First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement, supra note 89.
116. Ibid. at para. 55.
117. Ibid. at para. 57.
118. Ibid. at para. 58.
119. Ibid. at para. 61.
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compensation for the exceptional circumstances of Applera’s infringement.”120
3.3.  Answer and Counterclaims
In response, Applera put forward a number of affirmative defences to the claims 
of GTG.121 Foremost, it declared that Applera had not infringed, and was not 
infringing, either patent. Further, it alleged that both patents failed to comply 
with the requirements of the US Patent Laws, including lack of novelty, inventive 
step, and problems with the written specifications.122
Applera argued that the patents of GTG were invalid because they were 
anticipated and obvious in light of prior art. The company identified a range of 
prior art, which it alleged anticipated the patent applications filed by GTG.123 The 
company observed the following:
At least as early as 1978, researchers began publishing RFLP studies showing 
correlations between non-coding dnA sequence variations and disease-
related coding sequence variations. With the advent of PcR in the mid-1980’s, 
many more researchers published such correlations and described them in 
patents. Some of these references did not go unnoticed by the PTO. contrary 
to GTG’s representation in its Opening Brief, others had clearly recognized 
prior to GTG’s alleged “discovery” that non-coding regions contained 
significant, useful information. […] Accordingly, GTG was forced to disclaim 
any patent coverage for “occasional,” “empirically-determined” correlations 
of particular intron sequence polymorphisms with particular coding region 
variations. This disclaimer is further discussed below.
By the time GTG filed its first patent application, other researchers had 
applied non-coding sequence analyses to the 13-thalassemia, apolipoprotien 
B, and phenylalanine hydroxylase genes. Indeed, at least one researcher 
suggested that “any coding gene, defective or normal, will be surrounded by 
a unique set of dnA polymorphisms,” and another observed that if non-
coding gene regions are not conserved, “[i]t should be thus possible to derive  
 
120. Ibid., “Prayer for Relief.”
121. Answer and Counterclaims of defendant Applera Corporation, Genetic Technologies Limited v. Applera 
Corporation, No. C-03-01316 PJH (ND Cal, 5 September 2003), 2003 WL 23794380 [Applera, Answer and 
Counterclaims].
122. 35 U.S.C. ss. 102, 103, 112 (2004), <http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_35.shtml>.
123. Exhibit A refers to Yuet Kan, and Andree Dozy, “Polymorphism of DNA Sequence Adjacent to Human Beta-
Globin Structural Gene: Relationship to Sickle Mutation,” (1978) 75:11 Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 5631, <http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/75/11/5631>; Exhibit B refers to United States Patent 
No. 4,683,202 to Mullis (the inventor of PCR) <http://patimg1.uspto.gov/.
piw?Docid=04683202&idkey=NONE>; Exhibit C refers to Jurgen Geisel et al., “A New APA LI Restriction 
Fragment Length Polymorphism in the Low 28 Density Lipoprotein Receptor Gene,” (1988) 26:7 Journal of 
Clinical Chemistry and Clinical Biochemistry 429; Exhibition D concerns Peter Little et al.  “Model for 
Antenatal Diagnosis of Beta-thalassaemia and Other Monogenic Disorders by Molecular Analysis of Linked 
DNA Polymorphisms,” (1980) 285:5761 Nature 144 [Little et al., “Model for Antenatal Diagnosis of Beta-
thalassaemia”]; Exhibit E is John Guardiola et al., “Molecular Genotyping of the HLA-DQ [_] Gene Region,” 
(1988) 27:1 Immunogenetics 12.
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from the non-coding and flanking regions of the HLA-dQa gene probes 
capable of distinguishing a specific allogenotype in the presence of another.” 
These references were not before the PTO Examiner during the prosecution 
of GTG’s patents.124
In addition, Applera asserted that, by reason of the proceedings in the 
USPTO during prosecution of the applications that resulted in the issuance of 
both patents, “GTG is estopped from asserting any construction of the claims of 
the patent which would cover or include any of the purported acts of infringement 
of which GTG complains.”125 Finally, Applera argued that the claims of GTG were 
barred by the defence of laches. The company sought declaratory judgments of 
non-infringement and invalidity of both patents. 
There has been great debate over the validity and the scope of the 
patents held by GTG, especially in terms of their novelty and inventiveness. 
Mervyn Jacobson of GTG contends that the patents are novel, non-obvious, and 
useful.126 He maintains that this view is supported by a number of testimonials 
from famous scientists:
In fact going back historically, when we first published our work in the early 90s, 
the journal that published it chose to actually have an editorial commendation 
on the importance of our invention and the innovation of Malcolm Simons at 
the time—it was particularly noted as a worthy invention. Further, when we 
moved from just the one narrow field of HLA to more broadly, other human 
genes, animal genes, plant genes, we were supported by scientists around the 
world, including world leading eminent scientists like Professor Leroy Hood of 
the University of Washington in Seattle who wrote a testimonial, that this was 
totally unexpected and novel to him and should be patented, it was also 
supported by Professor Peter Gresshoff of the University of Tennessee at the 
time and an expert in plant genetics who made a similar comment... [and] by 
dr Pablo Rubenstein of the new York Blood centre and a number of scientists 
at that time who said this indeed is novel, this is unexpected.127
 
Jacobson claimed that the research on non-coding dnA by Malcolm Simons was 
breakthrough science. He argued that geneticists failed to appreciate the 
significance of the work performed by immunologists.
[T]he HLA experts had their own conferences and don’t particularly meet with 
other human geneticists, who don’t meet with the other animal geneticists, 
who don’t meet at conferences with plant geneticists—in fact they even use 
different language, the nomenclature, they use words differently, it’s almost 
like they’re on different planets.128
124. Applera Corporation’s Claim Construction Brief, Genetic Technologies Limited v Applera Corporation, No. 
C 03-01316 (PJH) (ND Cal, 30 July 2004), 2003 WL 23794399 at part B.
125. Applera, Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 121 at para 67.
126. Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Dr Mervyn Jacobson,” supra note 29. 
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid. 
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GTG has only quoted selectively from such expert testimony in its public 
relations.129 In July 1993, Professor Leroy Hood provided a testimonial in respect 
of the patents held by Malcolm Simons: “This observation was a great surprise 
to me.”130 His own data indicated, “the presence of informative polymorphisms 
in non-coding regions of these ‘vastly different types of genes’”131 in a range of 
species. He concluded that “these informative polymorphisms, which are 
indicative of haplotypes and alleles, are ‘present throughout the eukaryotic 
genome’.”132 In February 1992, Professor Peter Gresshoff commented that 
Simons work was unexpected: “Simons’ data may indicate that recombination 
within functional regions is suppressed, and occurs only at ‘hotspots’ at the end 
of a transcriptional unit, a genetic focus.”133 Professor Pablo Rubinstein described 
Simons’ work as “totally unexpected.”134 He said, “There was no reason, a priori, 
to believe that introns would be informative in this regard.” He further stated 
that “there was no reason to expect that Simons’ data relating to the HLA system 
would be ‘an isolated curiosity of nature’—it could be reasonably expected that 
the same principles would govern the evolution of alleles in other multi-allelic 
gene families.”135 dr Brian Tait wrote in February 1992: “The state of the art at 
the time of Malcolm Simons’ invention was that introns and other non-coding 
regions were thought to be fairly random dnA arrangements.”136 He observed: 
“However, we did not recognise that the non-coding region polymorphisms 
generally were sufficiently conserved to provide a complete typing system.”137 
He described Simons’ ideas as “‘a significant advance’ that could be used on a 
daily basis in the laboratory to type alleles.”138 The company was reluctant to 
publicly release such expert testimony in full in the course of the legal proceedings 
with Applera.139 The quality and credibility of such expert evidence would have 
an important bearing on the determination of the patents’ validity. 
Malcolm Simons and his friend the patent attorney, carol nottenburg, 
argue that the patents are indeed novel and inventive, but have expressed 
reservations about the scope of the claims asserted by GTG.140 The original 
inventor has issued a clarification concerning his view of the non-coding dnA 
patents.141 He sought to dispel some of the misconceptions about his research: 
“It has become obvious to me that the disbelief in, and reactions to, the patents 
mainly arise from imprecision in the wording of the patent claims, and from a 
failure to clearly distinguish my discoveries and inventions from prior art.”142 
Simons comments on the relationship of his research to the prior art:
129. Graeme O’Neill, “Prior Art,” Australian Biotechnology News (22 August 2003) 8.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Plaintiff’s Opening Construction Brief, Genetic Technologies Limited v. Applera Corporation, No. C-03-1316 
PJH (ND Cal, 16 July 2004), 2003 WL 23796524. 
140. Malcolm Simons, “‘Junk DNA’ Non-Coding DNA Patents: The Inventors’ View,” Simons Haplomics (18 May 
2004), <http://www.simonsjunkdna.com/Full%20Article.htm> [Simons, “The Inventors’ View”]; and Carol 
Nottenburg & Jade Sharples, “Analysis of ‘Junk DNA’ Patents,” Simons Haplomics (July 2004), <http://www.
simonsjunkdna.com/junk%20dna%20analysis.pdf>. 
141. Simons, “The Inventors’ View,” ibid.
142. Ibid.
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To my knowledge, all current dnA diagnostic test performed on non-coding 
sequences can be considered in two categories:
 (1)  mutation (alternative splice site) testing: where the site is 
  investigated for its inherent information, as in the cFTR, beta-globin 
  and PAH genes; 
 (2)  marker (haplotype) tagging: where non-coding sequence analysis is  
  used to characterize haplotypes in pedigree analysis, by linkage. 
The first category is not taught by the Patent since there is no coding 
sequence allele in linkage with the site being tested. The non-coding site 
cannot be in linkage with itself. Furthermore, the PAH gene report was 
recognized as prior art in the Intron diagnostic patent. 
The second category was argued in the patent prosecution history to be prior 
art. The earliest examples are the reports in 1978 by Kan and dozy(1,2). 
Amplification of prior-known RFLP sites as an obvious simplification of 
previous linkage carrier detection was also recognized in the Intron diagnostic 
patent as prior art (11,12).
I am unaware of any current dnA molecular laboratory test for disease-
associated gene diagnostics, or for HLA typing, that utilizes the method of the 
Intron diagnostic patent. 
By contrast, all uses of population-based Ld / Allele association fine-mapping 
seem to me to be encompassed by the Genome Mapping patent.143
 
Thus, Simons has also expressed reservations about the breadth of the patent 
claims made by GTG. Indeed, the morning after the Four Corners report, the 
scientist appeared on nine’s Today program to protest GTG’s behaviour. The 
immunologist told Forbes that he was “willing to take the stand for either side 
to clarify the patent if the Applera lawsuit goes to trial.”144 The inventor, 
therefore, is something of a maverick. He is an unpredictable, uncertain element 
in the whole controversy.
By contrast, a number of researchers and scientists were sceptical of the 
inventiveness of the patents, finding the broad claims to be dubious. Members 
of the public Human Genome Project have expressed doubts about the validity 
and the scope of the patents. Francis collins was surprised that the patent office 
had granted patents to GTG in respect of non-coding dnA:
I personally find it surprising that the GTG patent was issued, given the 
requirements of the PTO’s (US Patent and Trademark Office’s) novelty, non-
obviousness, and utility standard. After all, there were many prior published 
reports on the correlation of variation in noncoding regions with important 
mutations, going back at least to Kan and dozy’s The Lancet report on the 
sickle mutation back in 1978. But the validity of the patent is something for 
the attorneys, the PTO, and the courts, to weigh in on—not me.145
143. Ibid.
144. Zina Moukheiber, “Junkyard Dogs,” Forbes (29 September 2003), <http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2003/0929/052_print.html> at p. 2.
145. “Patent’s Place,” supra note 40.
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nobel Laureate Sir John Sulston was sceptical of the portrayal of Simons as “the 
genius of junk.” He observed, “the generality that there are very important 
sequences outside the narrow specific protein coating bits was well known 
throughout the 80s.”146 Sulston argues that the scope of the patent is of particular 
concern: “What he cannot possibly be justified in doing at that time is claiming 
all of the non-coding sequence in all organisms.”147 Martin Bobrow of cambridge 
University argued that the patents were a sign that biotechnology patents were 
too easy to obtain and that the rules governing patentability needed to be 
tightened: “Broad patents that lead to extraordinarily large rewards for 
extraordinarily little inventive input are a wholly destructive trend.”148
A number of Australian and new Zealand geneticists entered the debate 
about the patents relating to non-coding dnA and genomic mapping. Professor 
John Mattick of the Institute of Molecular Biosciences was concerned that the 
Catalyst program gave the misleading impression that his work vindicated 
Malcolm Simons’ claims to inventive insights about non-coding sequences.149 He 
expressed his views that the patents were lacking in novelty and inventive step 
on the Four Corners program.150 Professor Peter Little of the University of new 
South Wales doubted GTG’s claim that its principals made important discoveries 
concerning the nature of “junk” dnA that were not appreciated in 1989 by the 
scientific community.151 He observed the following:  
It is unclear to me why, in 1989, it was necessary to prove the idea that linked 
polymorphisms could be used to analyse functional variation: The fundamental 
principles and practice had been widely published, and these could be simply 
applied to any gene, including the HLA complex. Importantly, the concepts of 
haplotypes, linkage disequilibrium, and linkage had all been identified as 
directly relevant to the dnA-based analyses then available. 
146. Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Sir John Sulston,” Four Corners (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 9 
July 2003), transcript, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030811_patent/int_sulston.htm> 
[Holmes, “Interview with Sir John Sulston”].  
147. Ibid.
148. Rachel Nowak & David Concar, “Footing The Bill: Should We All Have To Pay For One Company’s Bright 
Idea,” New Scientist 4 (18 May 2002) at p. 5.
149. “Genius of Junk (DNA),” supra note 1.
150. Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Professor John Mattick,” Four Corners (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 10 July 2003), transcript, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030811_patent/int_
mattick.htm> [Holmes, “Interview with Professor John Mattick”].
151. Peter Little, “GTG’s Inventions Concerning ‘Junk’ DNA,” Bio-IT World (11 September 2003), <http://www.
bio-itworld.com/archive/091103/letters.html> [Little, “GTG’s Inventions Concerning ‘Junk’ DNA”]. Little cites 
a number of publications as prior art, including: Yuet Kan & Andee Dozy, “Antenatal Diagnosis of Sickle-Cell 
Anaemia by D.N.A. Analysis of Amniotic-fluid Cells,” (1978) 2 Lancet 910; Yuet Kan, & Andree Dozy, 
“Polymorphism of DNA Sequence Adjacent to Human Beta-Globin Structural Gene: Relationship to Sickle 
Mutation,” (1978) 75:11 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 5631, <http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=393021>; Little et al., “Model for Antenatal Diagnosis of 
Beta-thalassaemia,” supra note 123; John Phillips, et al. “Prenatal Diagnosis of Sickle Cell Anemia by 
Restriction and Endonuclease Analysis: Hind III Polymorphisms in Gamma-Globin Genes Extend Test 
Applicability,” (1980) 77:5 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2853, <http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=349503>; and David Botstein et al. “Construction of a 
Genetic Linkage Map in Man Using Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms,” (1980) 32:3 American 
Journal of Human Genetics 314.
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GTG’s contention that its principals had discovered something that was 
“largely overlooked” is not supported by the scientific literature. The 
comment that non-genic dnA is “a valuable and highly ordered reservoir of 
useful genetic information” is simply a restatement of what was first 
demonstrated in 1978 and applied widely. In this strict sense, such dnA can 
never be truly “junk” by virtue of its linkage to genes and must always be of 
potential utility.152
Professor Joe Sambrook of the Peter Maccallum cancer Institute 
observed that “the idea of using stretches of junk dnA to track genes was well-
established by the mid-80s.”153 Similarly, dr Graeme Suthers, a clinical geneticist, 
commented, “[t]he usefulness of non-coding dnA in biomedical research has 
been recognised for decades.”154 Associate Professor Paul Waring has contended 
that Simons’ invention should be limited to the use of non-coding haplotypes to 
determine coding region alleles in individuals without the need for information 
about other family members. He doubts whether the patent claims can be 
expanded from the HLA locus to non-coding dnA in a wide range of 
organisms.155 
3.4.   Settlement
Applera was initially reluctant to yield to the demands to pay licence fees in 
respect of non-coding dnA. It was very proud that it was leader of the private 
efforts to sequence the human genome. The company was unwilling to relinquish 
the status and kudos associated with the achievement of that big science project. 
Ironically, given its large patent holdings in the field of biotechnology, Applera 
became the white knight for universities and public research institutions. The 
company drew upon public research to help challenge the validity of the patents 
held by GTG.
In the meantime, GTG struggled to generate revenue and provide 
dividends to its shareholders. Indeed, the company lost AU$14,789,624 in 2004, 
and AU$11,917,008 in 2005. Since its formation as a public company, GTG has 
accumulated losses of AU$33,646,160. The company protested that its revenues 
had been affected by ongoing litigation. The 2005 Annual Report stated: “It is 
unfortunate to note that, in recent times, the legal action against Applera 
corporation has absorbed management resources that could have otherwise 
been spent pursuing licenses from other companies.”156 To be fair, GTG is unex-
ceptional in this respect: many biotechnology firms struggle to generate profits. 
After court-ordered mediation, GTG and Applera reached a final 
settlement of the patent dispute in december 2005.157 The two companies 
152. Little, “GTG’s Inventions Concerning ‘Junk’ DNA,” ibid.  
153. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” supra note 19.
154. Ibid.
155. Paul Waring, “Patenting Genetic Information,” Mutation Detection, International Symposium on Mutations 
in the Genome (July 2003).
156. GTG, Annual Report 2005, supra note 10 at p. 15.
157. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Reports Final Settlement of its Patent Dispute with Applera 
Corporation” (12 December 2005), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=262&fun
ction=NewsArticle>.
 The Alchemy of Junk  567(2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 539
executed a number of binding agreements, including a final settlement 
agreement, licence agreements, and a supply agreement. The terms of the 
settlement remained confidential: “The commercial terms of the settlement 
reached between GTG and Applera are subject to confidentiality requirements, 
but it can be disclosed that the settlement also includes a license to the GTG 
non-coding patents.”158 The district court for northern california formally 
dismissed the law suit between GTG and Applera on 30 december 2005.
After this announcement, the Australian Stock Exchange demanded 
additional details regarding the material terms of the agreement. In response, 
GTG reported that the estimated value of such agreements was AU$15 million 
and the final settlement included Applera taking a licence to the GTG non-
coding patents, and making payments to GTG in the form of cash, equipment, 
reagents, and intellectual property.159 The company stressed that the settlement 
would have further strategic benefits: “GTG believes that its settlement with 
Applera is its most strategic and therefore valuable deal to date.”160 For the most 
part, the marketplace appeared to be disappointed with the size of GTG’s 
settlement with Applera. Financial pundits noted that “the market was obviously 
expecting something bigger.  It swiped more than 20 per cent off the market 
value of the company.”161
Jacobson was triumphant about the settlement over the Applera 
litigation, suggesting that the share price of GTG should be re-valued in light of 
the outcome:
Today, with the Applera matter settled, nobody in the world is challenging our 
patents. For a little Australian company to file a lawsuit against Applera, and 
have the resources to see it through, and bear the associated legal costs for 
three years, is obviously very significant. […] Lots of people have hidden behind 
Applera, believed that time was on their side, if Applera could continue to 
obstruct us, and invalidate our patents—or simply wait us out.[...] now that 
Applera has come to an agreement with us, they have nowhere to hide.162
 
Applera was disgruntled by Jacobson’s characterization of the settlement. 
company representative Peter dworkin said that such statements were misleading: 
“The facts are that Applera has never conceded the validity or infringement of 
GTG’s patents, and settled the case on very favourable terms for Applera in 
order to spare it and its customers further distraction by the litigation.”163
Although the company has obtained a number of settlements and 
extracted a handful of commercial licences, the validity of GTG’s patents has not 
158. Ibid.
159. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Provides Further Details of the Settlement with Applera” (15 December 
2005), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=264&function=NewsArticle>.
160. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Reports Final Dismissal of Applera Suit, and Plans for the Future” (4 
January 2006), <http://www.gtg.com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130&artid=266&function=NewsArticle>.
161. Helen Westerman & Rebecca Urban, “Genetic wins little fight over DNA work,” The Age (16 December 
2005), <http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/genetic-wins-little-fight-over-dna-
work/2005/12/15/1134500961973.html> [Westerman & Urban, “Genetic wins little fight over DNA work”].
162. Graeme O’Neill, “GTG celebrates win over Applera in patent battle,” Australian Biotechnology News (12 
December 2005), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=548699165> at p. 2.  
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been tested and judged in a final, conclusive fashion by a court. As such, a 
number of outstanding issues remain. The novelty and the inventiveness of 
GTG’s patents remain the subject of great debate. The stance of Jacobson 
appears to differ from the position of the original inventor, Simons. It is unclear 
what weight should be attached to the expert testimony obtained by GTG from 
such scientists as Hood, Gresshoff, Rubenstein, and Tait. Similarly, it is not certain 
how a court would assess the evidence of public researchers in the field. Beyond 
questions of patent validity, there are larger issues about the capacity of parties 
to engage in such litigation. The scope of GTG’s patent insurance is confidential. 
It is not clear whether the company can continue to wage such expensive legal 
battles indefinitely. Similarly, one must question whether any entity has the will 
and the resources to challenge the patents of GTG. The best-placed company to 
do so, Applera, has settled court proceedings. It remains to be seen whether 
there will be any other opponents to GTG.
*
4. TRANS-TASMAN RIvALRy: THE AUCkLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD v 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
in 2000, the new Zealand government held a Royal commission on Genetic 
Modification.164 chapter ten of the final report provided a brief overview of some 
of the issues arising in respect of intellectual property and biotechnology.165 The 
report briefly canvassed some of the ethical issues arising from patenting living 
organisms.
In July 2003, cabinet directed officials of the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Economic development to report to cabinet on the issues relating to 
the patenting of genetic material and, in particular, whether there was a need for 
further public consultation on these issues.166 
In november 2003, the Minister for Health, Annette King, and the 
Associate Minister of commerce, Judith Tizard, released a report, Implications of 
Granting of Patents over Genetic Material.167 The report mentioned the litigation 
over the patents held by Myriad in respect of BRcA1 and BRcA2. It discussed at 
length particular concerns about the patents held by GTG: “A number of the 
organisations approached by GTG expressed concern at the relatively high 
licence fees being charged, the excessive breadth of the patents and have 
questioned whether these patents in fact presented any novel information at the 
time of issue.”168 The report recommended that the committee “[n]ote the health 
and life science sectors are currently in discussion with an Australian company, 
Genetic Technologies Ltd, regarding their patents on non-coding dnA.”169 It 
164. New Zealand, Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2000), <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/
organisms/law-changes/commission>. 
165. New Zealand, Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2002), <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/
publications/organisms/royal-commission-gm/index.html>, Chapter 10, <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/
publications/organisms/royal-commission-gm/chapter-10.pdf>.
166. Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents, supra note 23 at p. 1.
167. New Zealand-Minister of Health and Associate Minister of Commerce, Implications of the Granting of 
Patents Over Genetic Material (Cabinet Policy Committee, November 2003 [Implications of the Granting of 
Patents Over Genetic Material].
168. Ibid. at para. 18.
169. Ibid. at p. 7.
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observed: “These patents are of concern because of their breadth and the 
excessively high licensing fees being asked.”170 It also stressed the need for a 
response: “The Ministry of Health is concerned to limit the risk from such patents 
being granted or exercised in the future.”171 
The report noted that the Patents Act 1953172 was currently under 
review. A number of reforms could have an important impact upon gene 
patents:
The introduction of examination for obviousness will reduce the likelihood 
that patents will be granted over genetic material, or applications of genetic 
material that are no more than obvious variations on what is already known. 
changes to the utility requirement will mean that patents will not be granted 
unless the invention is shown to have a “substantial, credible and specific” 
use. This makes it less likely that patents will be granted over genetic material 
that has no demonstrated “real world” use.173
 
Furthermore, the report notes: 
The amended Patents Act will expand on the current exclusion from patent 
protection, of inventions whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
morality or “ordre public”, to include “where the prevention of such 
exploitation is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or 
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”174 
 
Most significantly, it will be possible to revoke a granted patent on this ground.
In June 2004, a second cabinet paper was released dealing with options 
to address genetic patents.175 First, the new Zealand Government was reluctant 
to prohibit patents on genetic material per se because of the difficulties in 
defining types of genetic material (given the rapid advancements in the field of 
biotechnology), the large amount of genetic material already patented, and new 
Zealand’s international treaty obligations.176 Second, the new Zealand 
Government emphasized the need to limit the breadth of claims made in 
biotechnology patents through the strict application of the criteria for patent 
validity. It noted that “the way in which the Intellectual Property Office of new 
Zealand (IPOnZ) applies the new criteria on applications involving biological 
material will be crucial in determining the breadth of patents on genetic 
material.”177 Third, the new Zealand Government recommended a review of the 
Patents Act 1953 (nZ): “This review would examine how the criteria of the Act 
170. Ibid. at p. 7.
171. Ibid. at p. 7.
172. Patents Act 1953 (NZ), <http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1953/0064/latest/DLM280031.html>.
173. Implications of the Granting of Patents Over Genetic Material, supra note 167 at para. 24.
174. Ibid. at para. 25.
175. Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents, supra note 23 at p. 1.
176. Ibid. at para. 4.
177. Ibid. at paras. 5–6.
570  university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
have been implemented and how the new criteria have been applied.”178
4.1.  Licensing
In a letter dated May 2003, GTG proposed two alternative proposals to dr david 
Sage, the chief Medical Officer of the Auckland district Health Board (AHdB) for 
use of its patented inventions. In its preferred proposal, GTG mooted a public-
private partnership with the AdHB and the Ministry of Health in new Zealand. It 
proposed the following:
•	 A sponsorship by GTG of selected nZ based genetic research projects 
using a substantial part (>50%) of the licence fees described below for 
the GTG non-coding patents.
•	 Free access to the breast cancer susceptibility testing IP of Myriad 
Genetics that have been exclusively licensed to GTG for new 
Zealand. 
•	 co-operation in potential subcontracting of laboratory testing 
activities between the various public testing laboratories in new 
Zealand and GTG on a commercial basis.
•	 The grant of a “national licence” for unrestricted use of the GTG non-
coding patents in human diagnostic testing by public sector institutions. 
(Administratively, this may perhaps be implemented through a master 
licence to one lab which would then sublicense other laboratories in 
the new Zealand public system.)
•	 An unconditional waiver from GTG for the past 13 years of infringement 
in new Zealand.179
 
GTG proposed that “[c]onsideration for such a national licence would involve a 
signing fee to address past infringement nationwide and an ongoing annuity for 
the life of the patents, which in the case of new Zealand, is until May 10, 
2011.”180 It suggested that “[w]e propose the fee for signing and waiving of past 
infringement be nZd$10 million and the ongoing annuity be nZd$2 million per 
year.”181 The public-private partnership would consist of nZd$5 million being 
offered back to new Zealand universities for research. 
Alternatively, GTG proposed granting a licence to each testing laboratory 
individually. Such a licence would include the following:
•	 Unrestricted use of the GTG non-coding dnA patents in human 
diagnostic testing by that particular laboratory.
•	 Free access to the breast cancer susceptibility testing IP of Myriad 
Genetics that have been exclusively licensed to GTG for new Zealand.
•	 co-operation in potential subcontracting of laboratory testing 
between the particular laboratory and GTG on a commercial basis.182
 
178. Ibid. at para. 7.
179. Ian Christensen, “A Letter to David Sage, Chief Medical Officer of the Auckland District Health Board” (23 
May 2003), available at Australian Broadcasting Corporation, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/
content/2003/20030811_patent/documents/page1.htm> at p. 1.
180. Ibid. at p. 1.
181. Ibid. at p. 1.
182. Ibid. at p. 1.
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The company observed:
We believe that volume related licence conditions would be impractical to 
administer and instead propose a simple arrangement, applicable to each 
laboratory, that would comprise a signing fee of nZd$2 million and an 
ongoing annuity of nZd$200,000 p.a. to May 10, 2011.183 
Jonathon Holmes questioned Jacobson as to whether the new Zealand 
Government should pay such fees for the use of the non-coding dnA patents. 
The journalist noted that, under the proposed agreement, “if they don’t pay for 
the non-coding patents, they won’t get the Myriad patent either.”184 Jacobson 
responded that “the new Zealanders should be pleased that the test that 
they’ve been getting which is subject to a new Zealand government patent and 
performed by government agencies illegally will be offered lawfully.”185 He 
elaborated that the quantum of the amount should not be given too much 
attention:
Some of those organisations themselves don’t think it’s an awful lot of money 
but it’s rather difficult to set a balanced value when you don’t know how many 
tests are being done and you don’t have all the information on which to base 
an intelligent assessment. Further, it’s part of a bigger discussion of what we 
call a public/private partnership, and a substantial part of the money that was 
proposed to be paid for those licences to legitimise what the new Zealand 
government agencies are doing would in fact would be ploughed back into 
further research in new Zealand including new Zealand universities.186
The journalist asked whether GTG would retain intellectual property rights in 
research that it invested in. Jacobson observed, “That’s normally the process 
when private or for-profit companies fund research in public institutes.”187 He 
nonetheless maintained that there would be some benefit to the new Zealand 
taxpayer arising from the commercialization of any resulting intellectual 
property.188
 Jonathan Holmes observed that at least a dozen crown research 
institutes in new Zealand, and a number of privately funded companies, had 
received letters from GTG suggesting that they needed licences. He asked, “is 
GTG using new Zealand as some kind of test bed for Australia, in terms of 
licensing non-coding patents?”189 Jacobson denied any such intentions:
We see Australia and new Zealand as our home territory and we are trying to 
adopt a very supportive and helpful view in bringing our technology to 
Australia and new Zealand, and also using the power of our technology 
overseas to bring other technology to Australia and new Zealand. It’s not that 
183. Ibid. at p. 1.
184. Holmes, “Interview with Dr Mervyn Jacobson,” supra note 29.
185. Ibid. 
186. Ibid. 
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189. Ibid.
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we wrote letters to these people, we went and saw them. There was a visit in 
May, I believe, where a colleague, my licensing manager and myself visited 
new Zealand, and we met these people to point out that, in fact, many of their 
activities fell within the scope of our patents and they needed licences.190
Jacobson concluded, “These are flexible ongoing negotiations, the final quantum 
always has to fit in or it doesn’t happen or it doesn’t work.”191 
In december 2003, Fonterra subsidiary ViaLactia Biosciences formally 
became GTG’s first new Zealand licensee. There was some criticism about this 
decision from the group, Mothers Against Genetic Engineering (Madge), which 
is opposed to genetically modified foods. dr colin South, of ViaLactia, said that
the company was not using human dnA in research. He said that ViaLactia 
and GTG have agreed to share information on gene technology. South also 
said that his company has purchased the rights to animal and plant code 
sequences to discover traits in plants and animals. He added that information 
from this “junk dnA” may benefit pastoral agricultural production.192
 In 2004, GTG representatives made several visits to new Zealand to talk 
to the Government, crown Research Institutes, and private research laboratories 
about licences they say they must buy in order to legally carry out gene 
technology research.
The AdHB acted on behalf of all the district health boards in new 
Zealand.193 Jacobson said that the company revised its licence fee down to the 
one-off figure of nZ$560,000. AdHB’s lawyer, Bruce northey, had corrected the 
original figures and provided more accurate information about the level of use 
of the genetic tests by the 20 health boards, which was much lower than 
originally estimated. He observed that: “The time it would take to settle the 
matter depended on ‘how much he (Jacobson) wants to arm wrestle’.”194
 Genesis Research corporation, an Auckland-based listed biotech 
company, 
is one new Zealand organisation that has made a stand against GTG. chief 
executive dr Jim Watson has spoken out previously about GTG’s assurances 
that it would enter litigation to enforce licences, as it was protected by its 
patent insurance. He also feared some [new Zealand] businesses might [pay] 
for a licence to protect themselves, even if they were uncertain whether they 
were infringing GTG patents.195 
After consulting lawyers, Watson was confident that his company did not 
infringe GTG patents.  In response, Jacobson argued that Watson’s arguments 
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. “ViaLactia Scuttles Madge Mischief,” Food Industry Week (10 October 2003). 
193. Paul Gorman, “Board Negotiates With Research Team:  Kiwi Funds Money In Junk,” Christchurch Press (16 
February 2004). 
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were “wishful thinking.”196 
In June 2004, GTG granted a research licence and a commercial licence 
for the non-coding patents to Ovita Limited of dunedin, new Zealand.197 
AgGenomics had signed a contract with Ovita to provide genetic-testing services 
on dnA samples of sheep from Australia and new Zealand at the AgGenomics 
high-throughput dnA laboratory at La Trobe University in Melbourne. Ovita will 
now pay to GTG an up-front signing fee and royalties on their future commercial 
sales. The Melbourne company observed, “GTG similarly stands ready to offer 
its assistance and technology to other new Zealand organisations, to support the 
efficiency and quality of new Zealand’s agricultural output.”198
4.2.  Litigation
In June 2004 Jacobson expressed his doubts whether negotiations with the 
AdHB lawyer Bruce northey, representing all the district health boards, were 
“proceeding in good faith.”199 He observed with exasperation:
I can’t deal with anyone who is that obstructive and obfuscatory. I have 
stepped out of the proceedings and handed it over to our attorneys. He 
keeps changing his position in a way that it is impossible to deal with him.200
He did not make it clear whether GTG was considering legal action against the 
health boards. “Jacobson said he wanted to ask northey why, as a new Zealand 
Government representative, he spent his day encouraging people not to deal 
with GTG and to disregard GTG’s patents which had been adopted by the 
Government.”201 
 northey said he was not upset by Jacobson’s comments about “not 
proceeding in good faith” and did not take the comments personally. He 
observed the following:
He’s certainly put that to me. Good faith requires openness and transparency. 
We have disclosed fully to him what tests we are doing and what issues we 
have.  
[…]  
When someone comes to us for $30 million, you don’t just go down the street 
and ask someone what to do. Business communications from day one have 
included lawyers. I’m not averse to that. We might get a more rational 
response than we do from him. It’s not legal action he’s talking about.202
northey said: “We’ve been working with him (Jacobson) for a while, asked him 
a number of questions, done a great deal of due diligence, (but) certainly not 
196. Ibid.
197. Genetic Technologies Limited, “GTG Grants second license in New Zealand: GTG Grants License to Ovita” 
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doing anything inconsistent with the laws of new Zealand.”203
In August 2004, AdHB announced that it was taking pre-emptive legal 
action against GTG in the High court in new Zealand.204 northey said AdHB 
decided to challenge GTG following an extensive analysis of the scientific and 
legal basis of GTG’s patents, involving members and advisers to the new 
Zealand health services community. AdHB is satisfied that its dnA testing does 
not infringe the patents and doubts that the patent claims are valid. AdHB has 
accused GTG of using implied threats of legal action to force the AdHB to pay 
access and royalty fees for the GTG patents. GTG failed to answer specific 
questions about the application of its patents to AdHB’s tests despite repeated 
requests for it to do so. northey noted, “nowhere else in the world is a public 
health provider paying licence fees to GTG for tests that are standard globally.”205 
He observed, “It is curious that GTG has chosen to make such demands in new 
Zealand for the first time.”206 northey said the AdHB’s position was that, while 
new Zealand encourages and supports research and development and the 
commercial protection of these through patents, patent licence demands 
needed to be subjected to proper scrutiny before public money was spent.
northey confirmed that GTG’s co-founder and inventor of the company’s 
non-coding dnA gene-testing techniques, dr Malcolm Simons, had been 
advising the AdHB and its legal counsel during its analysis. “It had yielded a 
‘consensus understanding’ of the claims and their relevance to all the genetic 
tests used by the AdHB that could be subject to licence fees if GTG’s 
interpretation of its patent rights was upheld.”207 northey said, “Malcolm’s 
summary was that, while the patents can be interpreted to relate to what he 
invented, nobody employing the methodology would be infringing the patents.”208 
northey said that the AdHB was prepared for the court case to happen as 
quickly as possible. The AdHB issued proceedings in the High court in Auckland 
alleging “groundless threats of infringement” by GTG.209 
In response, Jacobson was critical of AdHB’s account (in the media 
release) of negotiations with GTG over the past 18 months. He questioned why 
the new Zealand Government would issue a patent and then challenge the 
validity of such an invention:
By failing to respect a valid patent, the AdHB—itself a government agency—is 
undermining the integrity of the new Zealand patent system. […] This action 
challenges the rights of patent owners and diminishes the value of new 
Zealand patents. What message does this send to the investment community 
regarding the value of the fledgling new Zealand biotechnology sector?210
Such comments, of course, overlook the obvious point—the new Zealand 
Intellectual Property Office operates independently from the Government. The 
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Health Boards are perfectly entitled to take legal action to challenge the validity 
of granted patents.
4.3.  Settlement
In June 2005, the new Zealand High court appointed a retired judge, Justice 
Barry Pattinson, to oversee mediation between GTG and AdHB.211 In July 2005, 
the parties reached a settlement:
As a consequence of this settlement, the current High court proceedings 
between the parties will now be withdrawn, without payment by either party 
to the other. In addition, both parties have agreed not to pursue the other in 
future, in relation to these patents. In addition, as part of the same settlement, 
GTG is now granting commercial licences to the non-coding patents to four 
commercial new Zealand entities—AgResearch, HortResearch, Forest 
Research and Livestock Improvement corporation—who will together pay 
nZd$450,000 to GTG.212 
 
The parties agreed to keep the precise terms of the settlement confidential, 
while allowing each to comment on its circumstances.
The New Zealand Herald reported the result as a victory for the AdHB: 
“In the first case of its kind against Government-funded organisations, GTG has 
been sent packing empty-handed after mediation which saw High court 
proceedings withdrawn without costs and both parties agreeing not to pursue 
each other again in future over the patents.”213 Likewise, the Independent 
Business Weekly also suggested, “new Zealand’s publicly funded health boards 
continue to defy the licence-holder of a breast-cancer gene test they use, despite 
settling a two-year legal dispute last week.”214 AdHB lawyer Bruce northey said 
that the mediation process was “interesting.” He was satisfied with the outcome 
and with the fact that the district Health Boards would not have to pay GTG fees. 
“You come along to a country and demand considerable sums of money and you 
walk away with nothing.”215 GTG’s decision not to claim royalties “vindicated” 
the AdHB’s decision to challenge the validity of GTG’s patent claims. He said 
that GTG had declined to produce evidence for “robust scientific and commercial 
scrutiny” of the patents and their relationship to the health boards’ activities.216
GTG executive chairman Mervyn Jacobson was philosophical about the 
settlement, seeking to downplay its significance, suggesting that new Zealand 
was a special case:
The overall message is that drawn-out disputes are not good for either side. 
We needed to reach a settlement and get on with life. For whatever reason, 
211. Paul Gorman, “Mediation Causes Row,” Christchurch Press (26 March 2005) at p. 8. 
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213. “GTG’s Bid for Health Board Patent Fees Fails,” New Zealand Herald (8 July 2005) [“GTG’s Bid”].
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they initially chose to negotiate, and then fight, but finally, we’ve reached a 
settlement that is very acceptable to both parties. From GTG’s perspective, it 
addresses one small group, in one small country. We can now get back to the 
big picture, including our nasdaq listing and our global licensing strategy.217
Jacobson said that he was also happy with the outcome or the company would 
not have settled. GTG was receiving royalties from other patents in new Zealand 
and the decision would have no impact on those or on future business 
opportunities. However, he said northey was being “a little self-serving talking 
about vindication.”218 Jacobson concluded that, at the very best, the AdHB had 
only gained a pyrrhic victory: “The reality is they spent between $700,000 and 
$1m to prove a point which they could have achieved from working with us for 
half that amount.”219
*
5. GENE PATENTING AND HUMAN HEALTH: THE AUSTRALIAN  
LAw REfORM COMMISSION INqUIRy
in december 2002, the federal attorney general, The Honourable daryl Williams, 
commissioned the Australian Law Reform commission (ALRc) to undertake a 
review of intellectual property rights over genes and genetic and related 
technologies, with a particular focus on human health issues.220 This inquiry was 
prompted in particular by concerns about patents held on genetic testing by 
biotechnology companies such as Myriad Genetics and GTG. The ALRc commented 
upon the impetus for the review in the executive summary of its final report:
[H]ealth officials in Australia and overseas were expressing growing concern 
about the implications of gene patents and licences for the cost of and access 
to healthcare. Of special concern was the behaviour of one United States 
company—Myriad Genetics Inc (Myriad)—which holds patents over methods 
and materials used to isolate and detect mutations in two genes that may 
indicate a predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer (BRcA1 and BRcA2). 
[…] 
In Australia, Myriad licensed its BRcA1 patents to an Australian company, 
Genetic Technologies Limited (GTG). GTG announced during the course of 
the ALRc’s Inquiry that it was not proposing to charge a licence fee for BRcA1 
testing by public sector laboratories, nor would it require that all BRcA1 
testing in Australia be conducted at its laboratories. nevertheless, concerns 
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2005), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=1192139376>. 
218. “GTG’s Bid,” supra note 213.
219. Ibid.
220. “Inquiry into Human Genetic Property Issues,” Press Release (17 December 2002).
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remained within the health sector that other companies holding patents over 
genes associated with predictive and diagnostic testing would, in time, 
replicate the behaviour of Myriad.221
 
In this context, the ALRc considered the impact of gene patents upon research 
(and its subsequent application and commercialization), the Australian 
biotechnology sector, and the cost-effective provision of health care in Australia. 
There was much political debate over the impact of gene patents upon research, 
health care, and competition.
Along with biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, GTG argued 
that the current regime of patent law should not be changed, lest investment in 
the marketplace be affected. Jacobson stated the following:
I see the patent process as a very wholesome process. It’s been around for 400 
years. It started in Britain, but most countries in the world have adopted it, 
modified it. It works very well. You interfere with that process, you interfere with 
invention, you interfere with innovation, with risk taking. And, in fact, in 
Australia, if you drastically interfere with an established process, you run the 
risk of damaging or destroying biotechnology in Australia, which not only 
harms biotechnology companies but it’s negative for Australian health care.222
 
GTG argued that isolated genetic materials and genetic products should be 
regarded as “inventions” rather than “discoveries,” for the purposes of Australian 
patent law. It argued against prohibitions in respect of the patenting of genes, 
methods of human treatment, or medical diagnostics. GTG was hostile to the 
idea that ethical and social concerns about patents on genetic materials and 
technologies should be addressed through the patent system. It denied that 
there was any need to make special provision for individuals or groups whose 
genetic samples are used to make a patented invention, to benefit from any 
profits from the patent. GTG argued that changes to the requirements for 
patentability under Australian law for inventions involving genetic materials and 
technologies would hinder Australia’s quest to be at the cutting edge of global 
research and conflict with Australia’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.223 
By contrast, health care providers, scientific groups, and academics 
argued that there was a need to reform the patent system in order to 
accommodate genetic technologies.224 Some considered solutions that regulated 
221. “Genes and Ingenuity,” supra note 24, Executive Summary.
222. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” supra note 19. 
223. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
 <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm>, 33 I.L.M. 81 [TRIPS Agreement]. 
  Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides, “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the […] field of technology.”  This is subject to article 27.3 which allows 
Members to exclude from patentability, “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals” and “plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.”  
Article 30 further provides, “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.”  
224. “Genes and Ingenuity,” supra note 24 at pp. 115–116.
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the grant of patents, such as refining the standards of novelty, inventive step, and 
utility. Others considered whether there should be new defences to claims of 
infringement of gene patents, such as where patents are used for research, for 
private non-commercial purposes, or for medical treatment. Some supported 
solutions that regulated the exploitation and abuse of patents. They investigated 
the circumstances in which crown use,225 compulsory acquisition,226 and the 
compulsory licensing provisions227 of the Patents Act 1990 could be used.
Finally, a number of idealists expressed per se objections to the 
patenting of genes and gene sequences. For instance, Graeme Suthers of the 
South Australian clinical Genetics Service argued that biological inventions 
should not be allowed to be patentable subject matter:
Genetic research is increasingly being used for private profit. Many patents 
have been granted for items that should not be patentable and that this has 
the potential to greatly increase the cost of vital medicines and tests. The law 
should be changed so that human genetic information cannot be placed 
under private control.228
 
Such complaints were grounded in ethical concerns about the commercialization 
of scientific discoveries. 
5.1.  Political Debate
The debate over the effects of gene patents upon health care was a highly 
political matter in Australia. The Royal college of Pathologists of Australasia and 
six other similar entities sent a letter to the Attorneys General and the Ministers 
of Health of all the States and the commonwealth, warning that a critical service 
was at risk: 
The demand for genetic testing is continuing to grow, and high costs will 
delay or curtail the application of these tests in many areas of healthcare. 
Experience in both the US and canada is that enforcement of gene patents 
that impact on medical diagnosis resulted in increased costs, a marked 
reduction in genetic testing, medical and social consequences for those 
patients denied testing, and increased costs necessitated by using less 
efficient or less accurate tests.229
 
The Royal college said, “Genetic Technologies is now seeking to enforce the 
patents on both breast cancer genes and non-coding dnA. Enforcement of 
these patents will have far-reaching effects and could affect all genetic testing in 
the future.”230
225. Patents Act 1990, supra note 64, s. 163.
226. Ibid., s.171.
227. Ibid., s. 133. 
228. Graeme Suthers, “Our Genes: Humanity’s Heritage or Cash Cow?” (2004) 67 Issues 23 [Suthers, “Our 
Genes”].
229. Melissa Trudinger, “Gene Patents: Pathologists call on Governments to Challenge GTG,” Australian 
Biotechnology News (12 May 2003), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=1851794925>.
230. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,”supra note 19. 
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Within two days, the Royal college received a letter from GTG’s lawyer, 
clayton Utz, demanding a retraction.231 Jacobson denied that the company had 
ever threatened to enforce its patents in Australia:
Well, I’m puzzled that the college of Pathologists takes an extreme view 
without ever consulting us to establish the facts, and makes certain statements 
which turned out to be wrong. And that seemed to be their priority—to 
criticise us in some way— rather than to be more concerned about what we’re 
concerned about, which is the level of care of the women of Australia.232
 
Undoubtedly, the Royal college of Pathologists were given the impression that 
GTG would enforce its patents in light of its public statements about “genetic 
piracy” after the cross-licensing deal with Myriad. The college, though, conceded 
that it could provide no evidence that GTG intended to enforce such patents in 
Australia and new Zealand. Accordingly, the Royal college of Pathologists 
agreed to retract the statement.233
GTG denied that its patents on non-coding dnA and genomic mapping 
would stifle research. Jacobson stated the following:
GTG is itself a research group, and continues to support basic research in 
collaboration with leading Australian universities and institutes—in such areas 
as cancer susceptibility, foetal cell separation and testing, AIdS research, 
treatment of pathogenic infections etc. In fact, our non-coding patents were 
issued to us specifically as a result of our own past research and success in this 
area. GTG actively encourages research, and for anyone to suggest otherwise, 
is mischievous.234
 
 GTG argued that the current public health system was inefficient in its delivery 
of genetic testing because of duplication of services, organisational fragmentation, 
and the lack of research infrastructure. The company contended that the private 
sector could provide a comprehensive system of genetic testing, which could 
improve upon the quality and availability of the current service.
5.2.  Final Report
The ALRc released an issue paper in July 2003,235 a discussion paper in January 
2004,236 and a final report in June 2004, which was tabled in Parliament in August 
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid.
233. Genetic Technologies Limited, “A Report to Shareholders Genetic Technologies Limited Obtains Retraction 
of Wrong Statements by the Royal College of Pathologists of Australasia” (9 July 2003), <http://www.gtg.
com.au/index.asp?menuid=060.070.130.010&artid=98>; Melissa Trudinger, “Pathologists Back Down from 
GTG Attack,” Australian Biotechnology News (11 July 2003), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.
php?id=265599407>.
234. Mervyn Jacobson, “Bringing the Latest Advances in Cancer Susceptibility Testing to Australia,” Australian 
Stock Exchange Company Announcement (9 December 2002), <http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20021209/
pdf/00335135.pdf> at p. 2.
235. “Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Issue Paper, supra note 24.
236. “Gene Patenting and Human Health,” Discussion Paper, supra note 24.
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2004.237 The leviathan 678-page final report contains fifty recommendations. The 
ALRc took a decidedly cautious, tentative approach in its final report:
In view of the equivocal nature of evidence about adverse impacts on research 
and healthcare, the ALRc considers that it should adopt a cautious approach 
towards recommending radical changes in patent law and practice. Major 
changes should be proposed only in response to demonstrated problems. 
This is particularly so given that such changes have uncertain flow-on effects; 
for example, on future investment and innovation in genetic technologies, 
and on the development of the biotechnology industry. On the other hand, 
caution does not imply inaction, and the patent system must be flexible 
enough to deal with problems as they emerge.238 
 
The ALRc offered various recommendations for reform to government, 
independent agencies, industry, and funding agencies. It noted, “in a more 
complex environment in which authority is more diffused, modern law reform 
efforts usually involve a mix of strategies, including legislation, guidelines, 
principles, education programs, and changed practices.”239 As a result, only a 
few policy recommendations required legislative action.
First, the ALRc recommended that the Australian Government reform 
the Patents Act 1990 to provide that an invention will satisfy the requirement of 
usefulness in section 18(1)(c) of the Patents Act 1990 “only if the patent 
application discloses a specific, substantial, and credible use.”240 The law reform 
body observed the following: 
The ALRc considers that reform is needed to the way in which the usefulness 
of an invention is addressed in the requirements for patentability. It was 
evident from submissions and consultations early in the Inquiry that there is 
considerable confusion about the application of the usefulness requirement. 
These misunderstandings relate to the extent to which an invention claimed 
in a patent application must be useful; how such a requirement is imposed; 
the standard for satisfying this requirement; and the extent to which 
usefulness can or should limit the scope of patent claims.241
 
Article 17.9.12 of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004242 
states: “Each Party shall provide that a claimed invention is useful if it has a 
specific, substantial, and credible utility.”243 As a result of this Article, the 
Australian Government will be obliged to adopt USPTO utility standards. 
Recently, in Re Fisher, the US court of Appeals for the Federal circuit held that 
Monsanto could not patent express sequence tags in respect of maize because 
237. “Genes and Ingenuity,” supra note 24. 
238. Ibid. at para. 3.74. 
239. Ibid. at para. 1.21. 
240. Ibid. at para. 1.21. 
241. Ibid. at para. 6.138. 
242. Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (1 May 2004), 2005 A.T.S. 1, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/
negotiations/us_fta/final-text/index.html> [AU–USA FTA]. 
243. Ibid., ch. 17, art. 17.9, 13.
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there was a lack of utility and a lack of disclosure.244 no doubt this will also be a 
persuasive authority in Australia.
Second, the ALRc proposed that the Australian Government should 
recognize a defence under patent law for experimental use:
The ALRc believes it is desirable to remove uncertainty about the existence 
and scope of an experimental use exemption in Australian law. This approach 
received broad support in submissions. The existing uncertainty is unhelpful 
to the research community and commercial organisations. It has the potential 
to result in under-investment in basic research; and to hinder innovation if 
researchers become concerned that their activities may lead to legal action by 
patent holders.245
 
The ALRc rejected the narrow view of the research exemption adopted by the 
US court of Appeals for the Federal circuit in Madey, which affirmed that the 
defence was limited to actions performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”246 It instead supported the 
approach in the European Union, in which the defence of experimental use 
extended to research on a patented invention, but not with an invention. The 
ALRc concluded: “Moreover, basing a new provision on the European Union 
model would promote harmonization of Australian patent law with the law of a 
major trading bloc, and would give Australian courts the benefit of considering 
European case law in applying the new provisions.”247
Third, the ALRc proposed a number of amendments to the existing 
compulsory licensing regime in chapter 12 of the Patents Act 1990, “Given the 
unique nature of many biotechnology inventions, and hence their possible lack of 
substitutability, the anti-competitive exploitation of a patent could have significant 
implications for downstream research or access to certain healthcare services.”248 
The ALRc recommended that the federal government should amend the Patents 
Act 1990 to insert a competition-based test as an additional ground for the grant 
of a compulsory licence. It believed that such a test would address those 
circumstances in which there is a public interest in enhanced competition in a 
market, and the patent holder has not met reasonable requirements for access to 
the patented invention. The provision of compulsory licensing would be useful in 
the future, if a company abuses its dominant market position. Such measures 
would also be relevant in circumstances where the patent holder blocked access 
to inventions for research, treatments, and diagnosis.
Fourth, the ALRc promoted the use or acquisition of patented 
technologies pursuant to the crown use provisions in chapter 17 of the Patents 
Act 1990.249 The report observed the following:
244. Re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed Circ 2005), <http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1465.pdf>.
245. “Genes and Ingenuity,” supra note 24 at para. 13.77; for a summary of the wider debate over patent law 
and experimental use, see Rimmer, “Freedom to Tinker,” supra note 57. 
246. Madey, supra note 57 at para. 63.
247. “Genes and Ingenuity,” supra note 24 at para. 13.92. 
248. Ibid. at para. 27.38.
249. Ibid. at paras. 26.1–26.68.
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In some circumstances, the exercise of patent rights may have adverse 
implications for governmental or public interests. Where this is the case, the 
crown use provisions ensure that governments can step in to exploit a patent 
or authorise others to do so. These provisions may be seen as a “safety valve” 
in particular cases, preventing the public interest from being subverted by the 
patent system.250
 
The ALRc advised that the commonwealth should amend the Patents Act to 
clarify that, for the purposes of the crown use provisions, an invention is 
exploited “for the services of the commonwealth or the State” if the exploitation 
of the invention is for the provision of health care services or products to 
members of the public. Furthermore, it suggested that the commonwealth 
should amend the Patents Act to provide that, when a patent is exploited or 
acquired under the crown use or crown acquisition provisions in chapter 17 of 
the Patents Act, the crown must pay remuneration or compensation.251 
Finally, the ALRc considered the relationship between intellectual 
property law and competition law in the context of biotechnology.252 The ALRc 
recommended that the commonwealth should amend section 51(3) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (cth) (TPA) to clarify the relationship between Part IV of the 
TPA and intellectual property rights. The ALRc also advised that the Australian 
competition and consumer commission (Accc) should develop guidelines to 
clarify the relationship between Part IV of the TPA and intellectual property 
rights. The ALRc envisaged that such guidelines should extend to the exploitation 
of intellectual property rights in genetic materials and technologies, including 
patent pools and cross-licensing. As the need arises, the Accc should review 
the conduct of firms dealing with genetic materials and technologies protected 
by intellectual property rights to determine whether their conduct is anti-
competitive within the meaning of Part IV of the TPA. The ALRc also 
recommended that commonwealth, State, and Territory health departments, 
and other stakeholders should make use of existing complaint procedures under 
the TPA where evidence arises of conduct that may have an adverse impact on 
medical research or the cost-effective provision of health care.
Arguably, this reform agenda is a modest one. The solutions proffered 
by the ALRc are targeted mainly at the exploitation of gene patents. The 
fundamental weakness of the final report was its failure to address the initial 
grant of gene patents by the Patent Office. The ALRc failed to address patent 
criteria dealing with the threshold of inventiveness, such as “novelty” and 
“inventive step.” As a result, there remains a danger of the Patent Office granting 
broad patents of dubious inventiveness under the Patents Act. Arguably, the 
ALRc should have sought to amend the Patents Act to raise the standards of 
“novelty” and “inventive step” in section 18(1)(b). In his dissenting judgment in 
Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm, Justice Kirby observed that patents should 
only be granted if there is sufficient ingenuity: “It is not diligence and 
determination or the input of time, labour, skill and effort or the expenditure of 
250. Ibid. at para. 26.51.
251. Ibid. at para. 26.51.
252. Ibid. at paras. 24.1–24.106.
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resources that meet the criteria in the Act.”253 His Honour argued that there was 
a need for the test of “novelty” and “inventive step” of the Patents Act to reflect 
the complexities of contemporary science:
But the Act talks to science and invention at different stages. Its origins lie in 
earlier centuries and nowadays science, in the field of nuclear physics and the 
field of biology and in the field of informatics, has gone beyond the scope, 
immediate Eureka-type exclamations, it is more complex, and therefore, if the 
Act is to speak with relevance to science and technology as they exist today, 
the ultimate question that has to be addressed is whether in that moving 
context what is obvious moves with that change and therefore that with the 
advance of the availability of information, including through the Internet and 
so on, that you face up to the reality of that factual substratum to which the 
statute speaks.254
 
The ALRc should have also directed judges to attribute greater creativity and 
problem-solving skills to a person “skilled in the art.” McGill University academics 
Richard Gold and Karen durrell have argued that “the skilled reader permits the 
courts to introduce flexibility into patent law so that the context in which 
inventions are made and used is considered.”255 These canadian authors 
suggested that this device is particularly useful in dealing with biotechnological 
inventions: 
The use of the skilled reader permits the adaptation of patent law in a flexible 
yet transparent manner that at once ensures the continued relevance and 
functioning of patent law with the ability to adapt the law to take into account 
the particularities of new technologies such as biotechnology and information 
technology.256 
 
Perhaps the GTG patents on non-coding dnA and genomic mapping would 
have never been granted if such rigorous standards had been in place.
Furthermore, the ALRc was remiss in its failure to canvass a wider range 
of patent infringement and exceptions to patent infringement. The introduction 
of a defence of experimental use alone is insufficient. Given the expansion of the 
scope of patentable subject matter, there is a need in turn to broaden the range 
of exceptions to patent infringement. The ALRc should have sought to take 
advantage of the flexibilities available for patent exceptions under the TRIPS 
Agreement. In addition, there should be a defence in respect of personal, non-
commercial use of patented inventions. The federal government should also 
introduce a limited liability for medical practitioners in respect of patent 
infringement. This position is a necessary response given that methods of human 
253. Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm Pty Limited, 2002 HCA 59, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
HCA/2002/59.html>, (2002), 212 C.L.R. 411 at para. 161.
254. Kirby J., Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm Pty, transcripts, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/
other/hca/transcripts/2001/S287/1.html>. 
255. Richard Gold & Karen Durrell, “Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patent Law to New Technologies,” 
(2005) 19:1 Intellectual Property Journal 189, <http://www.ipgen.umontreal.ca/CIPP/040415_wp_en.pdf> at 
p. 192.
256. Ibid. at pp. 224–225.
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treatment have been treated as patentable subject matter.257 The report was also 
somewhat hollow because it was reluctant to engage with the ethical concerns 
held by many of the public in respect of gene patents. It is recommended that 
the Patents Act be amended to provide the requirement that a patent can only 
be granted if there is evidence of informed consent and benefit sharing.258 This 
requirement is a general one. It could arise in the context of genetic testing and 
biomedical research.
5.3.  Government Responses
Some commercial entities sought to portray the report as showing no empirical 
evidence of impacts on research and health care. GTG director, deon Venter, 
argued, “The report points out that many of the fears expressed about the 
much-touted negative impacts on research and healthcare were groundless.”259 
In response, GTG made the following controversial comments about the verdict 
of the final report delivered by the ALRc:
Finally, we are pleased to note the Australian Law Reform commission (ALRc) 
this week presented its 700-page report, entitled “Genes & Ingenuity: Gene 
Patents and Human Health (ALRc 99)” to Federal Parliament. GTG wishes to 
reaffirm it fully supports the work of ALRc. Indeed, GTG was pleased to be 
invited twice, and to have appeared twice, before ALRc, to offer its expertise 
and views to ALRc. In summary, ALRc has confirmed to GTG that it saw no 
problem with GTG’s patents or licensing practices, and GTG is pleased with 
the findings of ALRc.260
 
Such a gloss on the final report is inaccurate. The ALRc has given no such public 
or private undertakings that it had no problem with GTG’s patents or licensing 
practices. Indeed, the law reform body studiously avoided dwelling upon any 
particular controversy in the belief that such an approach would be 
unrepresentative. Instead, the ALRc offered general recommendations on 
reforms to patent law and genetic technologies. It is not the role of the law 
reform body to rule one way or the other upon the legitimacy of GTG’s inventions. 
The validity of the patents and the legitimacy of the licensing practices is 
ultimately a matter for the Patent Office and the courts.
257. Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v. Rescare Ltd (1994), 28 I.P.R. 383, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
federal_ct/unrep6846.html>; Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. FH Faulding & Co Limited (2000), 46 I.P.R. 
553, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2000/316.html>; for the United States, see Pallin v. 
Singer (D Vt 1995), 36 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1050; Metabolite Laboratories Inc. v. Laboratory Corporation of America 
Holdings (LabCorp), 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed Cir 2004), <http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/
opinions/03opinions/03-1120.html>; for Canada, see Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 
77, <http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc77/2002scc77.html>, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153; for New 
Zealand, see Pfizer v. Commissioner of Patents, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 364. 
258. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, 264 F.Supp. 2d 1064 (SD Fla 2003); Donna 
Gitter, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ 
Property Rights in Their Biological Material,” (2004) 61:1 Washington and Lee Law Review 257; Matthew 
Rimmer, “Miami Heat: Patent Law, Informed Consent, and Benefit-Sharing,” (2006) 3 Journal of International 
Biotechnology Law 177.
259.  Melissa Trudinger, “Gene Patent System Ain’t Broke, But Needs Fine Tuning:  ALRC,” Australian 
Biotechnology News (6 September 2004), <http://www.biotechnews.com.au/index.php?id=1801276438>. 
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 The Alchemy of Junk  585(2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 539
It is fair to say that the ALRc did not favour the opponents of gene 
patents. The law reform body was unwilling to tamper with the broad, open-
ended definition of “manner of manufacture.” Graeme Suthers argued that 
patents should not be granted in respect of genes and gene sequences on the 
grounds that they were mere scientific discoveries.261 By contrast, GTG argued 
that isolated genetic materials and genetic products should be regarded as 
“inventions,” rather than “discoveries,” for the purposes of Australian patent 
law. The company argued against prohibitions in respect of the patenting of 
genes and gene sequences. In the end, the ALRc held that there should be no 
absolute prohibitions upon the patenting of genes and gene sequences.
Ultimately, the ALRc did not accept the submissions of GTG that there 
should be no reforms to the Australian patent system, and that the status quo 
should be preserved. The commission made a number of modest recommendations 
for reform of the Patents Act. The ALRc recommended the establishment of a 
defence of experimental use, despite the protests of GTG that there was no 
need for such an exemption. The ALRc also called for reforms to compulsory 
licensing and crown use, to enable such mechanisms to be more accessible. By 
contrast, GTG was hostile to government intervention in relation to patents that 
had been granted by the Patent Office. In its view, the marketplace should 
resolve issues concerning access to patented inventions.
The federal government showed some initial reluctance in tabling the 
final report of the ALRc on gene patents and human health. In August 2004, there 
was a debate raging over whether the proposed Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement 2004 would result in the evergreening of pharmaceutical drug 
patents.262 The Liberal Federal Government argued that the patent system was 
working well, and there was no need to introduce reforms to the implementing 
legislation. By contrast, the Opposition maintained that there was a need for 
amendments to discourage the evergreening of pharmaceutical drug patents. In 
the end, the major parties agreed to pass the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement 2004 subject to the amendments proposed by the Opposition. Once 
this controversy subsided, the federal government released the final report of the 
ALRc on gene patents and human health in September 2004. There was little 
political comment upon the findings of the final report, which was unsurprising 
given that the federal election took place in October 2004.
Since its re-election, the Liberal federal government has yet to respond 
to the recommendations of the law reform body either in respect of gene 
patenting and human health, or the protection of human genetic information. 
There remain doubts as to whether the topic will be a legislative priority. 
Particular issues have been hived off  for further consideration by other law 
261. Suthers, “Our Genes,” supra note 228.
262. For a discussion of the debate over patent law and evergreening, see Kate Burton & Jacob Varghese, “The 
PBS and the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement,” Parliament of Australia Research Note no. 3 2004–2005 
(22 July 2004), <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2004-05/05rn03.htm>; Charles Lawson & Catherine 
Pickering, “‘TRIPs-Plus’ Patent Privileges—An Intellectual Property ‘Cargo Cult’ in Australia,” (2004) 22:4 
Prometheus 355; Peter Drahos et al., “Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade: The Case of 
the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement,” (2004) 22:3 Prometheus 243, <http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/
PDFs/drahos%20et%20al%20prometheus%20FTA.pdf>; Peter Sainsbury, “Australia–United States Free Trade 
Agreement and the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme,” (2004) 4:2 Yale Journal of Health Policy, 
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586  university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
reform bodies. AcIP has undertaken inquiries into both the defence of 
experimental and crown use. The government has yet to table its response to 
such investigations. The federal government will also be sensitive to the impact 
of any such reforms upon key industries, particularly the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology sectors. It would be loath to introduce any amendments to the 
Patents Act, which could jeopardize investment in research and development. 
countervailing that concern, the federal government is alarmed by the rising 
costs associated with the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. It may be willing to 
take some legislative action to curtail some of the expenses associated with the 
emergence of new medical diagnostics, such as genetic tests.
*
6. CONCLUSION
this article has considered the public debate over the patents held by GTG in 
respect of non-coding dnA, haplotyping, and genomic mapping. It has 
suggested that such patents are deserving of particular attention, both because 
of the exceptional breadth of their claims, and their potential impact upon 
industry, science, and health care. Professor John Mattick of the Institute for 
Molecular Biosciences has commented upon the scope of these patents:
I think the chances they’ll be challenged somewhere are very, very high—
simply because unlike other patents, this one—whatever its validity in terms 
of inventiveness, claims provenance over 98% of the human genome, and not 
just the human genome—the bovine genome, the eucalyptus genome—any 
genome. So that’s another part of the problem with it—that it’s very 
problematical whether it’s inventive, but it’s just as problematical in terms of 
its scope and I think that you know there is imbalance between—even if we 
accept that it’s inventive, there’s an imbalance between the level of 
inventiveness and the level of impact that this thing has.263
 
The important point is that the non-coding dnA patents have a general 
application, and have been used in research in the fields of agriculture, health, 
and the environment. There has been much animated discussion as to whether 
such far-reaching and extravagant patent claims are sustainable in light of the 
scientific prior art.
The robust licensing strategies of GTG have caused some consternation 
amongst private biotechnology companies, health care providers, and public 
researchers. GTG has sought significant commercial licence fees from an array of 
biotechnology companies who are engaged in genetic testing of plants, animals, 
and humans. The firm has hoped that companies would be willing to pay 
royalties, rather than endure the expensive, risky and time-consuming process of 
patent litigation. GTG has also sought research licence fees from universities and 
research institutions. The company has also sought to claim licence fees from 
public hospitals which are conducting clinical genetic tests. Perhaps the licensing 
263.  Jonathan Holmes, “Interview with Professor John Mattick,” supra note 150.
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tactics of GTG are symptomatic of a wider phenomenon. As Adam Jaffe and 
Josh Lerner have observed, 
Firms have always been eager to make money, and are always willing to 
exploit the legal system when it presents opportunity for commercial 
advantage. The granting of patents on important inventions has frequently 
involved controversy, and the exclusivity has always been a source of concern 
and unease.264
 
In response to its licensing strategy, GTG has faced concerted opposition. 
Several private biotechnology companies, most notably Applera, have questioned 
the validity of its patents, in light of the scientific prior art. The AdHB took pre-
emptive action against GTG for groundless threats of legal proceedings. Some 
private companies have voiced complaints about GTG in the media. The chief 
Scientist of Sequenom Inc. complained that its tactics involved “blackmail.” 
Scientists from universities and public researchers have been busy documenting 
scientific publications and research as prior art that could undermine the validity 
of GTG’s patents. It is uncertain whether the business model of GTG will be 
viable in the long term. In spite of its robust approach, the company has 
struggled to generate profits from its licence fees.
Since the settlement of the legal actions with Applera and AdHB, GTG 
has become embroiled in a new conflict. In August 2005, GTG and the agricultural 
biotechnology firm, Monsanto, entered into negotiations surrounding the use of 
the non-coding dnA and genomic mapping patents.265 In February 2006, dr 
Jacobson of GTG alleged that Monsanto had infringed its non-coding dnA 
patents through its dnA marker mapping and marker assisted breeding.266 In 
June 2006, Monsanto brought a legal action in the United States district court 
for the Eastern district of Missouri.267 The company noted that “GTG’s aggressive 
actions have created a reasonable apprehension on the part of Monsanto that it 
will face an infringement suit under the non-coding dnA patents [...] based upon 
Monsanto’s activities in using dnA markers.”268 calling for a jury trial, Monsanto 
has sought a declaration that a patent held by the Australian company GTG was 
invalid. Alternatively, Monsanto sought a declaration that it was not infringing 
the patent held by GTG. The litigation between Monsanto and GTG will have 
wider implications for patent law, research tools, and agricultural 
biotechnology. 
The dispute over the non-coding dnA and genomic-mapping patents 
reveals fault lines between the disciplines of law and science. In this particular 
case, there has been a disjunction between the judgments of inventiveness by 
the patent office and the courts, and the scientific assessments of the relative 
influence and significance of such research. Mervyn Jacobson of GTG maintains 
that law and science are polar opposites:
264. Adam Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents:  How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering 
Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at p. 76.
265. Complaint, Monsanto Company v. Genetic Technologies Limited, No. 3:06-cv-00989-HEA (ED Mo 2006) at 
para. 10.
266. Ibid. at para. 10.
267. Ibid. at para. 1.
268. Ibid. at para. 11.
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You are talking about two separate laws….You have the laws of science, which 
are absolute, where you can prod and pursue in the search of truth. Then you 
have the rules of law, which, especially in the case of patenting, are a hodge-
podge of man-made rules to create a workable procedure….
I know of scientists who have “secret inventions” that they don’t consider to 
be patentable—but quite often they are wrong. The final patent may be much 
more powerful than he or she would ever have understood.269
Arguably, though, Jacobson is presenting a false dichotomy between 
law and science, nature and man. Ideally, law and science should operate in 
harmony and balance, rather than in opposition and dissonance.270 There is a 
need for patent law to be informed by an understanding and appreciation of 
science. There is a need to recalibrate the patent system, so as to promote 
scientific research. The criteria of novelty and inventiveness should be applied 
rigorously in light of the knowledge of a person skilled in the art, taking into 
account an inventor’s capacity for creativity and complex problem-solving. The 
requirement of utility should be applied forcefully by patent offices and courts to 
prevent biotechnology companies from patenting genes without any knowledge 
of their function. Thus, researchers and scientists should be shielded by a 
defence of experimental use in respect of research on patented inventions. 
Furthermore, there should be a defence for personal, non-commercial use of 
inventions. There could be scope for mechanisms within the patent system to 
allow access to important research tools in the field of the biological sciences. 
There have been concerns expressed about gene patents and their impact 
on the cost of medical genetic testing, access to genetic counselling and health 
services, and the development of laboratory testing and expertise. The royalty and 
licence fees demanded of AdHB by GTG would be a significant proportion of the 
annual budget of many diagnostic genetics laboratories in Australia, new Zealand, 
canada, and the US. In his documentary Patently a Problem, Jonathan Holmes 
questioned: “Are the public health benefits of speedy diagnoses and groundbreaking 
research being jeopardised in a rush for a biotech bonanza?”271 There is a need to 
reform the patent system to ensure the best possible outcomes in respect of clinical 
research, patient care, and the administration of health care. Medical practitioners, 
and the clinical providers in respect of genetic tests, should enjoy a limited liability 
in respect of patent infringement. Health departments should take note of the 
activism of the AdHB and the Institut curie, and play a much more proactive role 
in intervening in patent proceedings. Public sector authorities should challenge 
patent applications and seek revocation of granted patents, which have an adverse 
impact upon health care. Furthermore, there should be greater use of compulsory 
licensing, crown use, and competition law to secure access to patented inventions 
on reasonable terms.
269. Binning, “Laws of Uncertainty,” supra note 8; for a similar statement, see the statements of Jacobson in an 
interview with a venture capitalist magazine: Paul D. Ryan, “The Alchemist,” The Australian Anthill (3 August 
2005), <http://www.australiananthill.com/main.php?page=ed_inside_issue11>.
270. The law and science movement is particularly interested in such matters.  See for instance, Gary Edmond, 
“Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence,” (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 216.
271. Holmes, “Patently a Problem,” supra note 19.
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Table 1. GTG: corporate Group
Source: GTG Annual Report 2006 at p. 44.
Parent ComPany
SUBSIDIarIeS
SUBSIDIarIeS SUBSIDIary
Genetic Technologies Limited
75.8%
Gtech 
International 
Resources  
Ltd
100%
Simons 
GeneType 
Diagnostics 
Pty Ltd
100%
Sibase 
Scientific 
Services Pty 
Ltd
 
100%
Genetic 
Technologies 
Corporation 
Pty Ltd
100%
Genetype 
Pty Ltd
50.1%
AgGenomics 
Pty Ltd
100%
GeneType 
Corporation
100%
RareCellect 
Ltd
65%
ImmunAid 
Pty Ltd
100%
GeneType 
AG
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Table 2. GTG: Key Patents
a. Intron sequence analysis method for detection of adjacent and remote locus  
 alleles as haplotypes 
United States Patent  5,612,179 
Simons  18 march 1997 
Inventors:  Simons; malcolm J. (Fryerstown, nZ) 
Assignee:  Genetype a.G. (Zug, cH) 
Appl. no.:  949652
Filed:  23 September 1992
Current U.S. Class: 435/6; 435/91.1; 435/91.2; 536/23.1; 536/24.3; 536/24.31;   
 536/24.33 
Intern’l Class:  c12Q 001/68; c12P 019/34; c07H 021/04; c12n 015/00
Field of Search:  435/91,6,91.1,91.5,91.2 935/77,78     
 536/24.31,24.32,23.1,23.5,25.3
 
USA  5612179  Granted  25-Aug-89  
USA  5192659  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Australia  672519  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Australia  654111  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Austria  E144797  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Belgium  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
canada  2023888  Granted  25-Aug-89  
denmark  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Europe  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
France  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Germany  69029018.7  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Germany  299319  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Great Britain  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Greece  3022410  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Hong Kong  1008053  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Israel  95467  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Italy  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Japan  2001-092923  Pending  25-Aug-89  
Japan  3206812  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Liechtenstein  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Luxembourg  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
netherlands  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
new Zealand  235051  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Singapore  47747  Granted  25-Aug-89  
South Africa  90/6765  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Spain  2095859  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Sweden  90309107.2  Granted  25-Aug-89  
Switzerland  414469  Granted  25-Aug-89  
USA  1361169  Pending  25-Aug-89  
USA  9/935998  Pending  25-Aug-89 
Patent Family  
(US and International)
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abstract
The present invention provides a method for detection of at least one allele of a genetic locus 
and can be used to provide direct determination of the haplotype. The method comprises 
amplifying genomic dnA with a primer pair that spans an intron sequence and defines a dnA 
sequence in genetic linkage with an allele to be detected. The primer-defined dnA sequence 
contains a sufficient number of intron sequence nucleotides to characterize the allele. Genomic 
dnA is amplified to produce an amplified dnA sequence characteristic of the allele. The ampli-
fied dnA sequence is analysed to detect the presence of a genetic variation in the amplified 
dnA sequence such as a change in the length of the sequence, gain or loss of a restriction site 
or substitution of a nucleotide. The variation is characteristic of the allele to be detected and 
can be used to detect remote alleles. Kits comprising one or more of the reagents used in the 
method are also described. 
Summary of Invention
Allelic variants of genetic loci have been correlated to malignant and non-malignant monogenic 
and multigenic diseases. For example, monogenic diseases for which the defective gene has 
been identified include duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle-cell anemia, Lesch nyhan syn-
drome, hemophilia, beta-thalassemia, cystic fibrosis, polycystic kidney disease, AdA deficiency, 
alpha.-1-antitrypsin deficiency, Wilm’s tumor and retinoblastoma. Other diseases which are 
believed to be monogenic for which the gene has not been identified include fragile X mental 
retardation and Huntington’s chorea.
Genes associated with multigenic diseases such as diabetes, colon cancer and premature coro-
nary athero-sclerosis have also been identified.
In addition to identifying individuals at risk for or carriers of genetic diseases, detection of allelic 
variants of a genetic locus have been used for organ transplantation forensics, disputed 
paternity and a variety of other purposes in humans.
In commercially important plants and animals, genes have not only been analyzed but genetically 
engineered and transmitted into other organisms.
Key Claims of 36 Claims
1.   A method for detection of at least one coding region allele of a multi-allelic genetic locus 
comprising:
a)  amplifying genomic dnA with a primer pair that spans a non-coding region sequence, 
said primer pair defining a dnA sequence which is in genetic linkage with said genetic 
locus and contains a sufficient number of non-coding region sequence nucleotides to 
produce an amplified dnA sequence characteristic of said allele; and 
b)  analysing the amplified dnA sequence to detect the allele. 
9.  A method for detection of at least one allele of a multi-allelic genetic locus comprising: 
a)  amplifying genomic dnA with a primer pair that spans a non-coding region sequence, 
said primer pair defining a dnA sequence which is in genetic linkage with said allele 
and contains a sufficient number of non-coding region sequence nucleotides to 
produce an amplified dnA sequence characteristic of said allele; and 
b)  analysing said amplified dnA sequence to determine the presence of a genetic 
variation in said amplified sequence to detect the allele. 
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B. Genomic mapping method By Direct Haplotyping Using Intron  
 Sequence analysis 
United States Patent  5,851,762 
Simons  22 December 1998 
Inventors:  Simons; malcolm J. (Glenluce, AU) 
Assignee:  Gene type aG (cH) 
Appl. no.:  293779
Filed:  22 august 1994
Current U.S. Class: 435/6; 435/91.1; 435/91.2; 435/91.53 
Intern’l Class:  c12Q 001/68; c12P 019/34
Field of Search:  435/6,91.53,91.1,91.2 536/24.31 
 
USA 5851762 Granted  11-Jul-90 
Australia  647806  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Austria  185377  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Belgium  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
canada  2087042  Pending  11-Jul-90 
denmark  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Europe  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
France  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Germany  69131691  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Great Britain  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Ireland  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Israel  98793  Granted  11-Jul-90  
Italy  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Japan  3409796  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Liechtenstein  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Luxembourg  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90 
netherlands  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90  
new Zealand  238926  Granted  11-Jul-90 
South Africa  91/5422  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Sweden  91912887.6  Granted  11-Jul-90 
Switzerland  570371  Granted  11-Jul-90  
USA  5789568  Granted  25-Aug-89 
Europe  EP0660877  Granted  01-nov-91 
France  FR660877  Granted  01-nov-91 
Germany  dE69232726.6  Granted  01-nov-91 
Great Britain  GB0660877  Granted  01-nov-91 
USA  US6383747  Granted  01-nov-91 
Australia  2005900728  Pending  16-Feb-05 
Australia  2005904603  Pending  24-Aug-05 
 
Patent Family  
(US and International)
abstract
The present invention is an improved genomic mapping method which is able to generate highly 
informative polymorphic sites throughout the genome. In addition to being highly polymorphic, 
the sites can be used to generate patterns that identify allelic and sub-allelic haplotypes 
associated with the region. 
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Summary of Invention
The present mapping method utilizes direct determination of haplotypes through analysis of an 
individual's genomic dnA. The present mapping method provides a way to obtain information 
regarding the amount of polymorphism associated with any genetic region of interest and to 
identify individuals having different alleles and haplotypes for the genetic region. In addition, 
the method provides information as to the distance and direction of a gene of interest, particu-
larly a disease gene, from a given genetic locus. This method is particularly useful for locating 
disease genes that are not associated with chromosomal rearrangements. 
The method also provides a rapid way to generate polymorphic markers throughout the 
genome, particularly in any genetic locus of interest. not only can the markers be identified and 
screened more readily than classical RFLP sites, but the markers are much more informative than 
classical RFLP sites, which are either present or absent at any given location. 
The present invention is based on the finding that non-coding region sequences, particularly 
intron sequences, contain genetic variations that are characteristic of alleles of adjacent and 
remote, linked genetic loci on the chromosome. In particular, primer-defined, amplified dnA 
sequences that include a sufficient number of intron sequence nucleotides can be used to pro-
duce patterns which are characteristic of alleles and haplotypes associated with a genetic region 
of interest. The patterns can be produced by gel electrophoresis length differences in the ampli-
fied dnA sequences or can be RFLP fragment patterns produced by digestion of the amplified 
dnA sequences with one or more endonucleases. Alternatively, once sufficient sequence infor-
mation has been obtained, allele/haplotype-specific amplification can be used to detect the 
presence of the selected allele/haplotype. 
The mapping method provides information about the degree of polymorphism of a genetic 
locus by determining the number of allelic and sub-allelic (haplotypic) patterns produced for the 
locus by analysing the dnA of numerous individuals. The method can be used to screen indi-
viduals to explore individual variation associated with a genetic locus of interest. The method 
also provides information regarding disease-associated genetic loci that can be used to study 
the population genetics of a disease, particularly monogenic disease.
Key Claims of 36 Claims
1.  A genomic mapping method for identifying informative, polymorphic markers and using 
said markers to identify a chromosomal region associated with a trait, comprising:
a)  obtaining a first set of genomic dnA samples from a plurality of individuals representing 
the diversity of a general population; 
b)  amplifying a non-coding sequence from a selected chromosomal region in each of said 
first set of genomic dnA samples to produce a first set of amplified dnA sequences; 
c)  analysing said first set of amplified dnA sequences to determine whether said non-
coding sequence comprises a plurality of polymorphic regions, wherein said plurality of 
polymorphic regions defines a plurality of haplotypic patterns detectable by a selected 
technique for analysing genetic variation; 
d)  determining the number of haplotypic patterns associated with said non-coding 
sequence that are distinct as measured by said selected technique, wherein each 
haplotypic pattern is a marker for a haplotype of said selected chromosomal region;
...
9.  A genomic mapping method for identifying a chromosomal region associated with a trait, 
comprising: 
a)  obtaining genomic dnA samples from a plurality of individuals with the trait from a 
general population, wherein said plurality of individuals with the trait is not derived 
from a single family; 
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b)  amplifying a plurality of non-coding sequences from a series of selected chromosomal 
regions in each genomic dnA sample to produce a plurality of amplified dnA 
sequences, wherein each selected chromosomal region comprises a plurality of 
polymorphic non-coding regions, and said plurality of polymorphic non-coding regions 
defines a plurality of haplotypic patterns detectable by a selected technique for 
analysing genetic variation; 
c)  analysing said plurality of amplified dnA sequences to identify the haplotype of each 
corresponding selected chromosomal region; 
d)  determining the degree of restriction in haplotype heterogeneity at each selected 
chromosomal region for said plurality of individuals with the trait, as compared to said 
general population; and
e)  comparing the degree of haplotype heterogeneity restriction across said selected 
chromosomal regions to identify a subseries of adjacent selected chromosomal regions 
having a greater degree of haplotype heterogeneity restriction at a central selected 
chromosomal region in said subseries than at selected chromosomal regions at the 
ends of said subseries as an indication that said central selected chromosomal region 
is associated with the trait.
C. Foetal Cell recovery method
United States Patent  5,447,842 
Simons  5 September 1995 
Inventors:  Simons; malcolm J. (Glenluce, AU) 
Assignee:  Genetype a.G. (Zug, cH) 
Appl. no.:  927313
Filed:  2 november 1992
PcT Filed:  27 march 1991 
PcT nO.:  PCt/aU91/00115 
371 date:  2 november 1992 
102(e) date:  2 november 1992 
PcT PUB. nO.:  Wo91/14768
PcT PUB. date:  3 october 1991
Current U.S. Class: 435/6; 435/2; 435/7.21; 435/7.24; 435/7.25; 435/29; 435/30;   
 435/378 
Intern’l Class:  c12Q 001/24; c12Q 001/68
Field of Search:  435/2,6,7.21,7.24,7.25,29,30,240.2 
 The Alchemy of Junk  595(2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 539
 
Australia  649027  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Austria  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Belgium  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
canada  2059554  Granted  27-Mar-90 
denmark  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
France  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Germany  69132269.4  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Great Britain  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Greece  3034487  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Ireland  910996  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Israel  97677  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Italy  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Japan  2965699  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Liechtenstein  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Luxembourg  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
netherlands  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
new Zealand  237589  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Singapore  79188  Granted  27-Mar-90 
South Africa  91/2317  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Spain  91906073.1  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Sweden  91906073.1  Granted  27-Mar-90 
Switzerland  521909  Granted  27-Mar-90 
USA  5447842  Granted  27-Mar-90 
USA  5153117  Granted  27-Mar-90 
canada  2492631  Pending  30-May-02 
Europe  3722092.8  Pending  30-May-02 
Japan  2004-509429  Pending  30-May-02 
nZ  537328  Pending  30-May-02 
USA  60/385,170; 10/516430  Pending  30-May-02 
Australia  2003229397  Pending  31-May-02 
Singapore  200406994-4  Pending  31-May-02 
USA  TBA  Pending  09-Jun-05 
USA  60/679,745  Pending  11-May-05 
Aust  2004217872  Pending  05-Mar-03 
nZ  542143  Pending  05-Mar-03 
 
Patent Family  
(US and International)
abstract
The present invention provides a method for selectively recovering foetal cells from a maternal 
blood sample. The method is performed on a blood sample from a pregnant woman having 
different first and second cell surface antigens expressed by a first allele of a polymorphic 
genetic locus and a second allele of a polymorphic genetic locus. The method separates 
maternal and foetal cells based on differential reactivities of the cells to antibodies specific for 
polymorphic cell surface antigens, particularly the HLA antigens. In particular, the foetal and 
maternal cells are separated based on the non-reactivity of the foetal cells to an antibody 
specific for a cell surface antigen encoded by a non-transmitted maternal allele. The method can 
be performed using solid phase-affixed antibody and recovering non-bound cells or using 
fluorescent labelled antibody and recovering unlabeled cells by fluorescence-activated cell 
sorting. In a preferred embodiment, the cells are also contacted with a second antibody specific 
for the second cell surface antigen. Foetal cells are separated based on their reaction with, at 
most, one of the antibodies. 
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D. other Patent applications 
aCtn3 Sports Performance testing
AcTn3 patent applications filed (16 September 2002) in Australia, canada, china, Europe, 
India, Japan, new Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and USA. Markers of predisposition to addictive 
states also filed in Australia and the United States (8 november 2004 and 24 August 2005). Use 
of VnTRs patent filed in the USA (1 October 2003).
For the first time anywhere in the world, we are able to offer a genetic test to determine 
whether you are naturally geared toward sprint/power events or towards endurance 
sporting ability. The test examines a gene known as ACTN3, which produces a structural 
protein found in fast-twitch muscle fibres. Research involving elite-level athletes from the 
Australian Institute of Sport has shown that the different forms (“variations”) of the 
ACTN3 gene may be associated with an improved ability to excel in either sprint/power 
events, or in endurance events. So whether you’re an athlete, or young athlete-to-be, the 
ACTN3 Sports Performance Test will help direct you toward achieving your maximum 
natural potential.
Available at Internet Archive, <http://web.archive.org/web/20060819074939/http://www.
genetictechnologies.com.au/index_athletic.asp?menuid=110>
Immunaid
Retroviral immunotherapy patent applications filed (18 August 2000) in Australia, Brazil, canada 
china, Europe, Japan, Singapore, and the USA; and granted in new Zealand and South Africa. 
Strategy for retroviral immunotherapy filed (20 February 2002) in Australia, Brazil, canada, 
china, Europe, Japan, new Zealand, Singapore and South Africa. cancer therapy patent 
applications filed (14 February 2002) in Australia, Brazil, canada, china, Europe, Japan, new 
Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, and the USA.
A technical review committee, which includes specialists in the field of HIV / AIdS and 
cancer, has been established to oversee the scientific activity of the ImmunAid program. 
This committee recently recommended that ImmunAid begin human monitoring trials. 
ImmunAid Pty Ltd then obtained ethical approval to commence these trials, which are 
underway in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. The mouse data have now been accepted for 
publication in the journal The Journal of Immunology, in a paper entitled “Timed ablation 
of regulatory cd4+ T-cells can prevent murine AIdS progression.” It is now planned to 
expand the human monitoring trials for patients with AIdS and patients with ovarian and 
possibly other cancers. It should soon become clear if a pathway exists to carry this work 
forward to a therapy for humans infected with HIV.
Available at Internet Archive, <http://web.archive.org/web/20060105113257/http://www.gtg.
com.au/index_general.asp?menuid=170.030.020>
animal Parasites
Patent applications in respect of a genetic test for cryptosporidium filed in Australia, Brazil, 
canada, china, Europe, Japan, new Zealand, Mexico and the USA (21 August 2002).
Laboratory techniques
Patents granted in respect of laboratory techniques in France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, 
and the USA (11 July 1990).
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Table 3. GTG: commercial and Research Licences
No. 
 
1 
 
 
2
 
3
 
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
 
10
 
11
 
12
 
 
13
 
14
 
15
 
16
 
17
Name
Genetic Solutions  
Pty Ltd 
 
Sequenom,  
Inc 
 
nanogen, Inc. – 
Effective date  
12 April 2002 
Inguran LP
 
Perlegen Sciences  
Inc 
 
Myriad Genetics,  
Inc.  
 
Biotage (formerly 
Pyrosequencing AB)
Orchid Biosciences  
Inc 
Association of 
Regional and 
University Pathologists
Quest diagnostics  
Ltd 
TM Biosciences 
corporation canada 
c.Y. O’connor ERAdE 
Village Foundation, 
Australia
Ovita
 
Genzyme  
corporation
Metamorphix
 
Vialactia Biosciences 
(nZ) Ltd
Laboratory 
corporation of 
America Holdings
Location
Queensland,  
AUS 
 
San diego,  
USA
San diego,  
USA 
Texas, USA
 
Mountain View, 
california, USA
Salt Lake city,  
Utah, USA 
 
SWE 
 
 
new Jersey,  
USA 
 
Salt Lake city,  
Utah, USA
 
new Jersey,  
USA 
 
Toronto,  
cAn 
 
AUS
 
 
dunedin,  
nZL
USA
 
USA
 
nZL 
 
 
north carolina,  
USA
field
Livestock 
Genomics 
 
Medical  
Genomics 
 
Genetic 
diagnostics 
 
 
Livestock
 
Genome  
Analysis
Genetic 
diagnostics
Reagants
 
Paternity and 
Forensic Testing
Pathology
 
 
Genetic 
diagnostics
Genetic 
diagnostics
Genetic 
diagnostics
 
Sheep  
Genomics
Human 
Genetic Testing
Animal Genetics
 
dairy Industry
 
Genetic 
diagnostics
Date
30 november 
2001
5 April  
2002
12 April  
2002 
12 June  
2002 
 
20 August  
2002
28 October 
2002
7 March  
2003
27 May  
2003
31 March  
2003 
 
1 August  
2003
31 december 
2003
June  
2004
 
28 June  
2004
17 September 
2004
4 October  
2004
8 October  
2004 
 
5 november 
2004
Licence
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
 
commercial
value
confidential
 
AU$ 
1 million 
AU$ 
620,000
 
$230,000
 
AU$ 
1.6 million
AU$ 
1.85 million
AU$  
5 million
confidential
 
AU$  
125,000
 
confidential
 
confidential
 
confidential
 
 
confidential
 
AU$  
7.5 million
AU$  
1.8 million
confidential
 
confidential
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No. 
 
18
 
19
 
 20/ 
 21/ 
 22/ 
 23
 
 
24
 
25
 
 
26
 
 
27
No. 
 
1
 
2
3
 
4
 
5
Name
Bionomics  
Ltd
Australian Genome 
Research Facility Ltd
AgResearch, 
HortResearch,  
Forest-Research -  
and Livestock 
Improvement 
corporation
Applera corporation
 
Optigen
 
 
Bovigen LLc
 
 
Innogenetics nV
Name
University of Utah
 
University of Sydney
University of 
Technology Sydney
King’s college
 
University of  
colorado
Location
AUS
 
AUS
 
nZL
 
 
 
 
 
USA
 
USA
 
 
USA
 
 
BEL
Location
USA
 
AUS
AUS
 
GBR
 
USA
field
Genetic Testing 
for Epilepsy
Genome Research
 
Agricultural 
Genetic Research
 
 
 
 
Genomics
 
Genetic 
diagnostics for 
Purebreed dogs
Genetic 
diagnostics for 
Livestock
Genetic Testing 
Kits
field
non-coding  
dnA Research
Genetic Research
Genetic Research
 
non-coding  
dnA Research
Genetic Research
Date
8 november 
2004
21 January  
2005
30 June 
2005
 
 
 
 
30 december 
2005
23 May 2006
 
 
1 June 2006
 
 
30 June 2006
Date
30 April  
2003 
 
22 July 2003
23 december 
2003
december  
2003
20 May  
2004
Licence
commercial  
Joint Venture
commercial
 
commercial
 
 
 
 
 
commrcial
 
commercial
 
 
commercial
 
 
commercial
Licence
Research
 
Research
Research
 
Research
 
Research
value
confidential
 
confidential
 
nZ$  
450,000
 
 
 
 
AU$  
15,000,000
confidential
 
 
confidential
 
 
confidential
value
confidential
 
confidential
confidential
 
confidential
 
confidential
Table up to date as of november 2006.
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Table 4. GTG: Patent Litigation
No. 
 
1
 
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
 
 
7
Parties
Myriad Genetics Inc. 
v. Genetic 
Technologies Ltd.
Genetic Technologies 
Ltd. v. Nuvelo Inc. 
Genetic Technologies 
Ltd. v. Covance Inc.  
 
LabCorp v. Genetic 
Technologies Ltd. 
 
Genetic Technologies 
Ltd. v. Applera 
 
Auckland District 
Health Board v. 
Genetic Technologies 
Ltd.
Monsanto v. Genetic 
Technologies Ltd.
Jurisdiction
US district court  
(d Utah)
 
US district court 
(nd cal)
US district court 
(nd cal)
US district court  
(d nJ)
US district court 
(nd cal) 
 
nZL High court
 
 
 
US district court 
(Ed Mo)
Complaint filed
26 August 2002 
 
 
 
26 March 2003
 
26 March 2003
 
22 december 2003
 
26 March 2003
 
19 August 2004
 
 
 
28 June 2006
Resolution
22 november 2002
 
 
12 April 2003
 
12 April 2003
 
20 February 2004
 
30 december 2005
 
7 July 2005
Outcome
cross-Licensing 
Agreement
 
Settlement
 
Settlement
 
commercial 
Licence 
 
Settlement
 
Settlement
 
 
 
Ongoing
Table up to date as of november 2006.

